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This thesis is an examination of Soviet-Finnish relations
v;ith the nurnose of determining: exactly what Finland's oosi-
tion is v/ith resnect to the Soviet Union and the decree to
which the Finns have maintained their autonomy. An analysis
of Finnish security v/ith resnect to Scandinavian NATO members
as v-;ell as tov/ards neutral S"/eden and the Srviet Union is
drawn together with Finland's domestic situation to nortray
a nation whose nosition is considerably different from what
it is comm.only perceived to be. Accordingly, the term Fin-
landization and v/hat it actually means is determined. Finally,
the potential of the Finnish annroach to dealing with the
Soviet Union is nosed as a model for other small oov/ers to
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What difference could a countr''^ like Finland make in
this v/orld dominated as it is by the superpov/ers? Of v/hat
sii^nificance is the role of the least r^opulated of the Scan-
dinavian countries v/hich claims to be neutral? Isn't Fin-
land and its relation v;ith the Soviet Union the nersonifi-
cation of the term Finlandization?
The misconceotions surrounding;; these and other '-ruestions
concernin.q the Finns and their v;av of coexisting v/ith the
Soviets nrovided the author's motives in choosing this thesis:
the T^eoole of Finland ane not a subjugated lot to be classi-
fied as just another of the Soviet satellites.
It is the Durrose of this thesis to determine the poten-
tial of Finland's foreign oolicy as a model for other small
countries to pursue in dealin^ \rlth a sunernov;er such s.s the
Soviet Union, Russo-Finnish relations have been tlie subject
of a v.'ide range of judgements, from condemnation and scorn
to admiration and en^r/ . This thesis v/ill examine Finland's
ability to maintain harmony v/ith the Soviet Union, v/hich is
remarkable; particularly, at a time when other Scandinavian
countries' relations v;ith the Soviets are deteriorating.
Relations betv/een the Finns and the Soviets are of a
unique nature and v/arrant close exajnination . Tov/ard this end
a brief historical summar:'- is provided in Chapter II v/ith the
focus of attention being the 'Winter 'ar. Havinrr provided this
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basis of Dersnective , the role of Finland in Scandinavia and
the sii;nificance of her strateqic nosition '\''ith resnect to
the neiqhborino; Soviet stronq;hold in the Kola Peninsula is
addressed in Chapter III.
The Drimary focus of this thesis is examined in Chapter
lY: Finlandization . V/hat it means from both a Finnish and a
Soviet nersDective is of q;reat imoortance for viev/in^r the re-
lationshio of these tv/o countries. Having defined these vie\/s,
Chaoter V deals v;ith the Communists' role in Finland and the
degree of Soviet control that is exercised over the Finns.
Finland's nrima.ry contribution to the subject of v/orld
arms control is summarized in Chanter VI. It is of diminished
significance in this era of fading detente oerhans, but still
enjoys considerable attention within Scandinavian circles.
The final chaoter extracts several suq^rested answers to
questions about the nature of Soviet-Finnish relations as v/ell
as the role of Finland in v/orld affairs. These conclusions
constitute the measure of the validity'- of this thesis. ^oT-iether
or not the reader agrees v/ith these conclusions, it is hone I
that at the very least this thesis v/ill nrovoke a nev; oer-
soective tov/ard the Finnish oeoole and their imnortance in
international affairs.
During the course of this research a visit to Finland
provided the opportunity to interviev; individuals from a
diverse sector of Finnish society. In order that the reader
might better understand the nersToectives of the author, it
8

seems aonronriate to brieflv introduce some of these
"oeoole
,
In resDOnse to a reauest for assistance in coordinating
this trin, the Finnish Ambassador to the United States,
Jaakko Ilonien, cabled the head of the Ministry of Forei~n
Affairs' oress section, Jaakko Ber'^qvist, v/ho v;as m.ost con-
genial and receotive to any and all questions and requests.
The majority of the coordination of interviev/s, ho'.-zever, v;as
managed by the office of Karl IltJttOlS., the editor-in-chief
of the Yearbook of Finnis'h Foreign Policy nublished b^ the
Institute of International Affairs. After an initial session
v/ith Mr, MOttOia, he channeled his interoretations of this
thesis' ournose into the most annrooriate sources of infor-
mation. These sources ranqed from those individuals mentioned
belo'7 to a v/ell-stocked librar^/, access to v/hich v/as nrovided
between interviev/s. This v/as valuable both to make final
oreparations for interviev/s and to oursue follov/-un ouestions
on unresolved issues.
The significance of the accuracy and in-depth under-
standing of Mr. MOttOia's perceptions of the questions out
forth v/as very imoortant. His thorough grasp of the issues
addressed in this thesis proved to be of great value. Pin-
pointing v/ith orecise accuracy the most reliable as v/ell as
comDrehensive sources of information, Mr. MOttOia and his
staff insured an unbiased and comnlete oersoective of the
issues was nrovided in a minimal amount of time.

Professor Aounen, head of the oolitical science deoart-
ment at Tamnere University v;as the most outsnoken of those
interviev/ed. His party affiliation with the social democrats
often outs him at odds v;ith President Kekkonen's viev/s and
his sometimes radical positions v;ere a constant source of
contrast to the staid reo;urgitations of the party line pre-
sented by such men as the Chief of Political Affairs in the
Ministry of Foreicrn Affairs, Klaus Tttrnudd. The conservative
and reserved remarks of Mr. TOrnudd v/ere tightly controlled
responses which adhered strictly to official nolicy.
Similar renlies to Questions were received from the
military sector, renresented by Dr. Kalevi Ruhala and Dr.
Pauli Jarvenoaa. of the Institute of Military Science, Hel-
sinki
.
Of a more moderate nature were the sessions with Mr.
Kivinen, editor of the foreign affairs section of Finland's
leading daily, Helsinqin Sonomat (circulation 400,000), who
had just returned from a trio to Moscov/. Along these same
lines, the conversations vrith Mr. Jaakko Bergqvist were
similarly rev/arding as candid views were readily forthcoming.
10

II. HISTORY ATID THE 7INTER v/AR
Finland enioys a unicue relationshiD v/ith the Soviet
Union, which is to a lar^e de,q;ree, based on the historical
precedent that has been set. After over 6 50 years in Sv/edish
union, Finland snent just over a century (1309-1917) as a
Russian Duchy. Prior to the nineteenth century tremendous
Scandinavian influence was inculcated in the Finns, Equally
in-Dortant v;as the sr^irit of indenendence v/hich nervaded every
action of the Finns both individually and as a nation. This
independence -rrev; out of their livelihood of forestry v/hich
remains the •orlraairr industry todav. As a Finnish author put
it: "The severity of life in the north and the ever nresent
forest moulded the Finnish character. In the baclcA'oods a man
must rely on himself, on his ov;n strenr^th and his own inven-
1tiveness." The sicrnificance of this heritacre cannot be dis-
counted
.
3y becominn; allied -with Sv/eden, Finland also orecluded
invasion by conquorina hoards and established a legacy of
private ov/nershio of land. The loose control exercised by
Sv/eden left the Finns to lar^^ely determine their own fate
and further cultivated the democratic ideals which have oer-
sisted in Finnish q;overnm.ent
.
As S^'/edish oov/er faded in the eighteenth century, Finland
became increasinc;ly aware of the nersistent threat from the
east. The Sv/edes, led be Kin-^ Karl XII, v;ere decisively
11

defeated after overextendino; themselves into Russia and
the Tsar's armies overran Finland. This oromoted a natural
shift in Finnish posture as her very survival v/as threatened.
The occuDation of Finland by the Russians (1713-1721) left
a bitter taste in the Finns' mouths. The hate v/as rekindled
less than a century later as Russia once aqain occunied Fin-
land in conjunction v;ith the establishment of the Continental
Blockade to fend off Manoleon (1308-9).
The end result of this last occuoation v/as that Finland
v;as declared an autonomous Grand Duchy. In srite of this
Russian intervention, hov/ever, the Finns v/ere able to pre-
serve their v;ay of life and continued to run their 'government
seoarate from that of Russia. Other evidence of independence
v/as manifested by the continuation of the constitution v/hich
had its orioiins in the Sv/edish neriod. Additionally, the levels
of taxation v/ere not increased and the Finns v;ere not con-
scrinted for service under the Tsar.
This v/as the be.r^inninp; of the unioue relationship the
Finns have v;ith their neighbor to the east. Based on a com-
bination of factors: their historical back^^round, o-eoqranhic
position, reliction, lane^ua^'^e and livelihood, the Finns de-
veloped as a peaceful neighbor v/ith a distinct autonomous
nature. The people of Finland v/ere thoroughly canable of
coexistincf in snite of not sharing much of the Russian ex-
perience. Perhans the most obvious examole of this is the
fact that the land of Finlo.nd v/as never tilled by serfs,
12

but rather b^'' land-ov;ninq peasants. The sharo contrast in
style of q^overnment also emnhasizes the disparity in national
life stvles betv;een the Russians and the Finns.
••Jhat emerged from this nineteenth century ex-oerience
vfith the Russians is an acceptance of the oast Sv;edish rule,
tolerance of the imoosed Russian presence and an overall
quest on the nart of the Finnish oeonle to be themselves.
This notion is nerhaos best exDressed in the motto of
mid-nineteenth century Finland: "''/e are no longer Sv;ede3,
2
v/e cannot become Russians, let us then be Finns.'" Just
as nationalism dominated the *30litical scene throughout
Eurooe in the last half of the nineteenth centurv, so too
did it see its rise in Finland. Tsar Alexander II v/as ex-
ceedingly tolerant of the nationalist reforms in Finland,
further increasing the autonomy of his Grand Duchy. Ethnic
factions v/ithin Finland snlit the oonulace along language
lines as Sv/edish sneaking citizens had little tolerance for
v/hat they considered the inferior Finnish tongue snoken by
ever-increasing numbers. Fortunately for Finland, as so
often haopens , the common enemy - Russian oppression - keot
the two factions together. The Finns felt remote indeed from
the intricate diplomatic maneuverings of Bismarck. The ef-
fects, hov/ever, of mounting European tensions \-iere felt as
Russia's insecurity drove her to extrem.e measures to fend
off Prussian imnerialism. The bonds of all Finns became




The seeds of rebellion v/ere nlanted as the Finns started
dovm the road to independence.
Finland continued to follov; the lead of Suronean move-
ments, though being snared the radical extremes by virtue
of the more relaxed assimilation. The continuity v/hich had
been evident throughout Finnish histor-"- continued in her
drive tov;ards independence. Her bureaucracy had been long;
established a.t both the local and federal level. Thus Fin-
land had many of the makings of an independent state even
before the revolution.
Finland achieved her indenendence in 1917, the same year
the Soviet Union emerged out of the tattered remains of Russia,
Wracked by the nunishinc? blows of World War I, Finland's
neighbor to the east lacked both the means and the inclination
to prevent her former Grand Duchy from going her own v/ay. The
Russification orocrram that the Tsar had tried to imoose had
served to accomnlish nuite the onnosite effect of its ob.iec-
tives, the Finns havinq been united in onnosition to it.
Certainly, a sufficient concentration of force and effort
could have subdued and forced the absorb tion of the Finnish
people into the Russian fold, hov;ever, an adeauate effort
v;as not forthcoming. Consequently, follovring the successful
coun in Petrograd and Lenin's accession as the new leader of




In search of a head of state, the Finns turned to the
fev/ military leaders v/ho had gained experience durin,^ '/orld
V/ar I, and Mannerheim became the "father of Finland."
Throu<7hout the inter-v/ar neriod, Finland sought to main-
tain amiable relations v/ith the nev; Soviet state v;hile at
the same time suonortinci; the drive for indenendence and
cooneration of the Baltic states. In spite of Finland's
attempts to remain neutral, the looming threat that Hitler
nosed to the Soviet Union eventually '.70uld initiate a tragic
series of events that culminated in a total realin;nm.ent of
v;orld nov/er.
In 1939 beqan v/hat v;ould becomie the sin-^le m^ost si'^nifi-
cant event in the entire histor^/ of relations betv/een Finland
and Russia - the '.^inter ''.'ar. To emohasize the importance of
this conflict, the events leading up to the outbrealc of hos-
tilities in riovember of 1939 and the continued bargaining
throughout the struggle v/ill be examined. The nrimary means
3
of analysis v/ill be Allison's model of bureaucratic oolitics.
In November 1939 v;hen the Soviets attacked Finland, every-
one except the Finns anticinated the quick caDitulation which
had marked the rendering of fraternal assistance to the Bal-
tic States. The Soviets v/ere first among those v;ho had de-
luded themselves into visions of encountering a submissive
pODUlace and quickly yielding military resistance. Before
a cease fire brought this onening scene of '.^orld War II to
a close, 200,000 Soviet soldiers lay dead and frozen on the
15

4Karelian trontiers. This is contrasted v/ith the Finns
5losses of rouqhly 25,000 killed. Puttin:; these fi~ures in
oersnective v;ith resnect to the nonulation to mai<;e them
more meaningful, consider that the Finns had a oonulation of
3.89 million in 1939 of v/hich annroximately 200,000 v;ere in
the military service.' The Soviet Union had a force of 1.2
7
million that they brou^^ht to bear on this venture. The en-
tire Soviet military force of annroximately 2.6 million in
3 ^1939 v;as dravm from a oonulation of roughly 160 million."
So v/hile the Finns lost about 125: of their force, the Soviets
incurred an 8?? casualtv rate in losinq; as many men as the
total Finnish army numbered. In addition to this imm.ediate
unantici-^ated cost in nc.noo'ver , the Soviets and the com.munist
movement v/hich they sav/ them.selves heading, had lost consi-
derable prestige.
"So severely had Soviet military reputations been mauled
in the earlier stages of the v/ar that the final episodes took
on a character of revenge for a.nd restitution of a badly tar-
nished honour," Perhaps this display of inentness v/as ex-
tensive enough to convince Hitler that the road to Moscov/ v;as
not so formidable after all.
The purpose of this chapter is to conduct an analysis of
these events and the diplomacy v/hich caused them, employing
11
Allison's model of bureaucratic politics. Having briefly
established the historical background, the questions sug-
gested by Allison in his model v/ill be addressed. It is
16

incumbent uoon this author to note that, as is usually the
case in dealincr v/ith matters involvin'7 the closed society
of the Soviet Union, painfully little is available about
decision-makin<7 in the Kremlin. Thus, the Finnish nersnec-
tive is difficult to refute as authoritative, and for '^timoses
of this analysis, no attemnt v:ill be m.ade to identify any
bias. The paucity of Soviet material on this sub.iect is
particularly acute as the Soviets v/ere loath to reveal the
de<Tree of their inentness to the extent that they have even
forbidden the release of all Finnish records on the v/ar
until 1980.
Just as Allison labeled the dominant feature of bureau-
cratic politics in the Soviet Union as a continuous stru-^gle
for Dov/er in analysis of the Cuban Missle Crisis, so too
must Stalin's reqimie be assessed for our nurooses here. The
inevitable consenuence of this fact took on a somev/hat dif-
ferent tv/ist in 1939, hov/ever, as the nov;er strup;f^le was
v/ithin the military as v/ell as in the Kremlin. Hence, not
only did the Dolicy issues become involved v/ith the oov/er
nlay, but v;ith the tactics and strate.^y on the battlefield
as v;e 1 1
.
Before examininq the Winter V/ar itself, a brief overviev/
of Allison's m.odel and the questions it noints us to is use-
ful. This v/ill better enable us to determine v/hy the deci-
sion to initiate hostilities v/ith the Finns v/as made by the
Kremlin. This anproach v;ill reauire identification of the
17

primary actors, analyze v/hat coalitions and bargains they
struck, v/hat compromises v/ere made and at the same time,
1?
"convey some feel for the confusion." Finally, the cost/
benefit relationshin v;ill be examined to see v/hether an over-
all advantap;eous course of action v/as follov/ed.
The Russians deluded themselves into anticitDating an
easy victory. A combination of factors, including belief
in their ovm '^ro^Daganda, caused this misconception. The re-
sult v/as that after a month of fi^rhtintr, the Soviet offensive
had ground to a halt and the incomnetence of the Soviet m.ili-
tary -vas on disolay. Jorld sentiment anxiously follov;ed the
valiant Finns as they stood un to the ominous nower of the
Soviet Union, symbolic of a democracy defendinp; itself against
totalitarian imperial ismi . Unfortunately, the Finns attained
only marginal success in translating this sym.nathy into con-
crete surioort, and v;as eventually doomed to accept the inevi-
table defeat. The Soviet reaction to the embarrassm.ent v;as
to blame the Finns for "mobilizing first and sending a dele-
13gation af ter^.'/ards" and to blame the v/estern democracies m
general for causing "mad hysteria to be v/hinoed uri against the
14Soviet Union all over the v/orld."
The Kremlin's apnroach to the problem v/as tried and nroven
v/ith unhesitating success in the cases of the Baltic States.
Stalin and Molotov had become overconfident and nrobably never




Action channels became secondary considerations as the
level of intensitv in ne^-otiations cuickly rose to limit the
num.ber of actors to a very fev/ central olayers. Soviet
decision m.akin^ v/as thorou.qhly dominated by Ilolotov and
Stalin, v/ith the Finns focal point beinq Paasikivi and to
some extent, Tanner. Other lesser roles v/ere clayed be the
Sv/edes' Prime Minister Hanssen, Daladier of France, German
Minister 31tAcher and United States Secretarv of State Hull.
The nerinheral nature of the roles 'Dlayed by characters not
directly associated v;ith the confrontation bet',7een Finland
and the USSR is particularly emphasized and their involvement
for nurr^oses of this naner are accordingly limited.
This is contrary/' to the case made for consensus building
by Professor Valenta in his recently published book on the
1958 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia v/herein he uses the
examnle of Stalin conferrinq; v/ith three men (Kuusinen, Zhdanov,
15
and Tributs) to build support for his case. ^ Both Manner-
1 Pi
heim in his memoirs and Tanner in his book on the '7inter
17
Vfar state that they are convinced that Stalin's mind v/as
made up before nen^otiations be.cran. Therefore, v;hat m.ay have
taken on the color of consensus buildin,?^ may in reality have
only been an attempt to patronize these three. It could also
have been a form of consensus buildin,-^ after the fact.
NarroTving the cast to the central fi,o;ures of Stalin,
Molotov and Paasikivi v;ill orovide a relatively thorough
19

analysis and v;ill facilitate a demonstration of the useful-
ness of the follov/incT questions in analyzin'T the events.
The question of hov/ nast stances (or historical nrece-
dent) and personal ity affect the central nlavers is of par-
ticular si^rnificance in assessinn; the necrotiations . I'/hile
Paasikivi and the state he represented v/ere obviously onera-
ting from a position of v/eal<ness v/ith resnect to the relative
strength of Russia, the historical experience of the Finns
in their loner association v/ith their nei::^hbors to the east
undoubtedly had considerable imnact.
Paasikivi v/as ideally suited for the tasl^ of neqotiatin,^
v;ith the Kremlin. The v;hole mood of the talks '.'/as set ini-
tiallr'' at an informal level as l^aasikivi's linguistic skills
1
8
nrecluded the need for internreters . In the more relaxed
atmosohere that ensued, the exoerienced statesman v/orked
methodically to enhance his nosition.
The oersonalities of Stalin and Molotov are not dissi-
milar, narticularly v/ith resnect to their manner of dealing
with small countries. The fact that it v;as deemed a conces-
sion on the part of this duo to discuss the issues gives a
clear indication of th3ir condescending nature as statesmen.
The Finns v/ere av/are of the ruthlessness v/ith v/hich Stalin
had dealt v/ith all the potential enemies, both real and ima-
gined. Still, Paasikivi fought to preserve the self-resnect
of his neoDle and himself. Criticized for a soft line an-
nroach by Finnish liberals, he v/as essentially a victim of
20

the parameters established by Parliament. Regardless,
ilolotov and Stalin left little room for maneuver.
The source of the Soviet r^osition can lo'^ically be
traced to the terms of the non-a.^Tression nact with Germiany.
The Russians had re<i;arded Finland as a buffer state since
1 q
it had become a Grand Duchy in 1309. " The signature of the
Russian-German Pact on 23 Auq-ust 1939 in Moscov provided not
only for abstention by either party from attack on the other
and for neutrality bv either '^artv if one were attacked by
a third D^rty, but also had been nreceeded by several nointed
overtures. In Hitler's Reichsta- sreech of 28 Aoril 1939 he
made a specific offer of bilateral non-agqression nacts ^7ith
the Scandinavian and Baltic States v/hich Denmark, Latvia and
20Estonia accented.
The dividing; un of the border states by Germ.any and
Russia in con,iunction v/ith the siq;nin.g of the non-aggression
pact left little doubt as to the fate of the lesser nov/ers.
Finland v;as included v/ith the Baltic States in the Soviet
snoils and it is a loqical extension of the progressive ab-
sorotion of these states that leads one ouickly to the con-
clusion that the fate of Finland v;as sealed before negotiations
prior to the V'inter ^7ar commenced. As V. Tanner remarked,
"V/hile the negotiations v;ere underv/ay, the Soviet demands
tended to increase and did not by any means come closer to
21
the Finnish nosition as mi<7ht nrooerly have been exnected."




conformity v;ith a rlan v/hich had been adonted in advance.""
The Soviets' collaboration v;ith the Germans indicated. Rus-
sian ex'^ectations of Finnish accentance. It anoears that
the decision to liberate Finland had been made before ?aasi-
kivi made his first trio to Moscow, and in Stalin's and
Molotov's eyes it v/as only a question of v/hen and at v/hat
price
.
As is usuall-/- the case v/ith crisis si 'cuations, a dead-
line v/as faced, -vhich further aggravated the Soviets' efforts
to achieve domination. Unfortunately for the Russians, tl\ey
did not recognize soon enough nor did they accord sufficient
resnect to the dominatin-T, control that the onset of ''/inter
v/ould imnose on the Red Arm-^ ' s invasion. Finland, on the
other hand, knew the advantages its v/inter warfare trained
troops would p^eSn and the potential for -orovidin:?; enough de-
lay for the intervention on their behalf by the allied forces.
The aid was never forthcomino;, but the winter dealt a crinoline
blow to the Soviet forces, combining v/ith the tenacity of the
Finns' defense of their homieland to make a lasting imnression
on v/orld oninion.
In addressin,^- where foul-uns are most likel.-"', the hor-
rendous bog~lin~. of the assault by the Russian m-ilitarv lead-
ers cannot '^^e attributed entirely to their incomnetence . Rather
it v/as a combination of factors. Of c^reat significance v/as
the existence of a po^-zer stru^f^ie v/ithin the m.ilitary v/hich
severely distracted from a coordinated effort in both the
22

planning and the executing; of the invasion. Secondly, there
v/as the intanf:^ible factor of motivation on the nart of both
armies; the Finns determinedly defending; their homeland, and
the a^'Tressors beinq devastated on a foreign frontier. rior
can the oractical consideration of this bein^ the first com-
bat the Red Army enga^^ed in since the Civil '''ar be discounted.
In addition, the Soviets v;ent to Finland v/ith an armv
which had lost most of its leaders to Stalin's r^ur'^es. The
Red Army v;as ill-equioDed for ^.-/inter warfare, since they felt
there v;ould be no oroblem conauerin^ the Finns before the
onset of v^inter. This linked directly to the role that the
Soviets' overconfident nature ^nlayed, Thoroucrhly convinced
that they v/ould be v/elcomed as liberators, the Soviets m.arched
into Finland ooorl^'- orenared to fi^ht. Many nrevious ills
of the Red Army plagued commanders in fighting the Finns.
Combined arms onerations ouickly ran amuck as the narochial
interest affiliated v/ith Soviet defensive doctrine persisted.
A host of tactical and logistical foul-uns served to hinder
Soviet offensive onerations as well.
Finally, there v;as the disastrous factor already dis-
cussed in its role as a deadline: v;inter.
An OSS renort of 1944 vintage sums uo the temnerajnent
and military qualities is the Finns as follov;s:
In tem':)erament , the Finns are usually slov;, stubborn,
deliberate and have considerable staving newer. Mili-
tary Qualities were shov/n by the '^^^ ^" 1939-1940 to
be of a high order. Foreign observers no less than
Finnish enthusiasts agree that the Finn is a tough,
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intelligent soldier. He could stand the ri^^ors of
exactin-:! fiq;htincr, v/orked vrell in q;rour}S and disclosed
marked capacity for independent initiative and action. 23
A oraisev/orthy assessment v/hich overlooks one critical incrre-
dient: freedom-lovin?^.
The risks of intervention v;ere areat for the Soviets.
The unknovm quantities of v/hat the allied resnonse v/ould be
and the essentially untested, inexnerienced , ill-equinoed
Red Army should have tempered the enthusiasm for intervention.
If it is true "that Soviet nerceotions of the risks involved
in the use of military force are one of the main factors in-
^ 24fluencin^ decision mailing," then the Kremlin v/as certainly
Doorly acquainted vrith the realities of the situation. The
brutal results of the Winter War alone testify to how unore-
nared the Red Army really v/as.
The final decision mav have been influenced si.'Tnifica.ntly
by the "exi.qencies of bureaucratic affiliation and by the
ability of some olayers to maneuver rivals, and not solely
by the merits of the situation or the ar'^uments put forward
25by individual decision makers." The ar-^uments against the
consensus buildin^^ thesis have already been made, however,
and perhaos the real reason is much more straight forv/ard:
the die had been cast with the signing of the German-Russian
non-aggression pact.
In summary, this analysis shov/s the cost-benefit rela-
tionshin of the Winter War. The Soviets came out the losers
in three resoects. The most detrimental effect v;as loss of
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v/orld nresti^e as a consequence of havino; apneared vxilnerable.
Secondly, there v;as the tremendous cost in lives already cited
Last, and most si'^nificant for the r^urnoses of this analysis,




Ii:^. SCANDINAVIA AND STRATEPrlC SIGrilFICAUCS
The securit^^ policy of NATO's northern flank has in-
creased significantly in relative innortance as a consequence
of developments in v/eanons' technoloc^y. In the shift of em-
phasis in the sune.r-oov/-ers ' nuclea.r v/eaponry from land-based
to submarine-launcrie'l missiles,- seci.iring bases for these ves-
sels has made geography a basic strategic factor." The signi-
ficance of the Soviet threat in this re'3;ion v;as clearly started
by former ?IATO commander, C-eneral Haig, in a 21 March 1278
ne''.'s conference in '.'hich he asserte I :hat "the more likely
2
challen'^es that we v/ill be laced ^/ith are on the ilanks" not
in the central region of Europe.
The imnortance of the Kola Peninsula as the harbor of
Russia's northern flank forces has inserted a ne'v factor into
NATO's relationshio v/ith the Soviet Union. The strate^^pic im-
portance OL th.is area is bein'^ dealt 'vith by actors outside
the NATO Alliance ami the Warsaw Pact as v/ell. It is the our-
pose of this chanter to ansv/er the question of v/hat imnact
this Soviet buildup in the Kola Peninsula is having on the
direction and nature of Finnish forei^-n policy and v/hat impact
thdr- could have on the future of Soviet foreign nolicy.
The aonroach. that v/ill be taken in formulatin^r^ a response
to these 'Questions '.'/ill be to nrovide, by v;ay of introduction
the strate'^ic si-^nificance of the Kola Peninsula, Finlan-"'. 's
25

military nosture and finally a synoosis of Finnish-Soviet
relations, reiteratinfr some of the joints made 'r^reviously
in Cha'T^ter II.
After this introduction, the relationship of the Scan-
dinavian balance to this area v;ill be investigated v;ith
particular emnhasis focused on Norv;egian oolicy as a poten-
tial model for Finland. Finland's unicue annroach to a nolicy
of active neutrality will then be examined, follo'/ed bv an
investigation of v/hat Finlandization means to the Finns, in-
cludinr:; the role of the dominant nersonalit-^ of President
Kekkonen. The subiect of Finlandization v/ill be dealt v;ith
in deoth in the next chanter.
Finally, in an analysis of these facts, the significance
of Soviet foreign policy trends and reciprocal Finnish trends
will be viei/ed.
/'ith nev; v/eanons technoloqv comes new strategy and, as
mentioned in the oneninq oaraQ:raoh, si't^nificant shifts in the
Dosture of flATO's northern flank have taken place.
In quest of a base for her ever-^rov/in^r submarine fleet,
the Soviet Union turned to the onlv unrestricted access to
the Atlantic that this vast, somewhat landlocked continent
affords: the coast of the Kola Peninsula. The si,g,nificance
of this area can be annreciated in terms of the nuclear bal-
ance itself. Denial of this area to Soviet submarines v^ould
3
seriously imnair the Soviet's retaliatory caoacitv. This




of the world's mi'^htiest concentrations of military nov/er.
The Soviet Union's stren,qth on NATO's northern flank has a
direct bearinf^; on the Sast-''.'est nuclear balance. The Soviets
have been denloyino; their Delta Class 14,000 ton nuclear
submarines armed v/ith SStl 8 missies out from Murmansk, each
5
v/ith a ranqe of 5,000 miles.
Of the four Soviet fleets, the Northern fleet is -athout
doubt the most no'verful. "It contains tv;o-thirds of the
second-strike caoability of the Soviet strate'^ic forces (in
ballistic missle submarines) and boasts 185 submarines and
5betv/een four and five hundred surface warshios." The com-
mander of North Norv/ay characterizes the Soviet military com-
plex in the Kola Peninsula as the lar-^est and most concentrated
7base in the v;orld.' Comol^ementinrr this material is a around
force that even by conservative estimate is over half the size
of Finland's entire pooulation. "Includinq the Oround Forces
Senior Units, the estimated total of soldiers in the Kola
gPeninsula amounts to 270,000.
Havin-^ seen the intensely ominous nature of thinf^s to
the east, let us turn to a brief examination of Finnish domes-
tic defenses.
Universal conscriotion is the la^/ of the land in Finland,
oblic;atinq all males betv/een seventeen and sixty years of a^e
to military service. From this nooulation base, forty thou-
sand men are cycled throuf^h an eicrht month enlistment consis-
tinp; primarily of training. This maintains a rer^ular army of
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p.nnroximately fortv thousand surrolenented by a reserve of
Q
almost seven hundred thousand. ' This re'iresents a hicher
ratio of reservists to active duty than anv other western
, . 10
nation.
In 1971 narliajnentary action v;as initiated to reeva.luate
the Finnish defensive nosture. It should be noted, this is
the same time frame in v/hich it v/as reco'^nize'i not only in
Finland, but throughout the free viorld, that a ^rov/in-^ threat
v;as DOsed by the Soviet activity in the Kola Peninsula.
Partially as an outcrro-vth of these narliamentar;'^ inves-
ticrations, military staff members were assi'^ined to civil de-
fense district councils to effect a permanent laison with the
civil authorities. In addition a nev; n;eneral secretary of
the civil defense orTanization , a senior colonel, v/as recruited
from the re'^ular army. This obvious emphasis on the intec^ra-
tion of the civil defenses into the overall defense structure
v/as com.bined v;ith a shift to an area defense concent and a
steady modernization nroq;ram.
V,T-iile publicly adherinq to a defense strategy based on
renellinq an attack from the V/est, the obvious nerceived
11threat comes from the opnosite direction. Justification
for a bolsterin!7 of area defenses v/here the Soviet forces
would most likely invade is based on the orincinle that Fin-
land cannot be used as a sta<7inp; area for operations in the
1?
strate<^ically imnortant northern seas.
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Havint? set the starve for this investi^,ation of the
factors irriDactinf^ on formulation of Finnish forei<-;n oolicy
tov/ard the Soviet buildun in the Kola Peninsula, one can
nov/ turn to examination of nertinent facts.
V/hile the oerspective of this thesis is nrimarily lookin;^
east from Finland, the Scandinavian nei^^hbors to the north
and v;est cannot be ignored in ansv/erin-^ the orecis. All five
Nordic nations share common history and culture as v/ell as
DOlitical traditions and systems. V.'ith these common roots,
it v;as not unnatural for these comnaratively small nov;ers to
band together for common economic benefit. nevertheless,
senarate oaths tov/ard security v;ere follov;ed. Finland fol-
lov;ed Sv/eden on a oolicv of neutral itv v/hile Norv/av, Denmark
and Iceland allied them.se Ives within NATO. On the surface
this solit mi^ht represent an exploitable v;eakness from the
Soviet noint of vievf, but a closer examination v/ould reveal
nuite the onoosite orobability . Should the Russians attemot
to lure Norv/ay and Denmark av;ay from NATO by encoura-^in'^ the
formation of a Scandinavian bloc, the risk of the Scandinavian
13
neutrals driftin^^ v/estv;ard Tvould arise. This v/ould be un-
accentable to the Soviets, narticularly in the case of Finland
as it v/ould represent the nrosi-^ect of having NATO on the thres-
14hold of the "v/orld's lar-^^est naval and subm.arine base."
Finland had no real choice initially in determinin-r './hat
her foreign nolicy would be, and many doubted the assuredness
of Finland's survival as an independent nation. Hov/ever, the
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interdenendence anono; the Scandinavian states, in the sense
that 'vhat ha'onens to one affects all of the others, qave the
Nordic nations the stren,p:th of independence through their
unity. In Januarv 1949 when Denmark and Morv;av v/ere on the
ver'^e of .-ioinin?; NATO, the Soviets acknov;led'?ed the oresence
of this balance by their expressed concern, Darticularly to
15
Norv/ay. In sunmary, the Scandinavian bloc, for all its
fragmentation, remains a balanced, secure area to be reckoned
v;ith as much more than m.erely five mini-states.
Havin.'^: Placed Finland in context v;ith its Nordic nei'^h-
bors, an internretation of the Finns reaction to Soviet foreii;n
policv is necessar;"^ in order to fully develon the often m.is-
understood relationship^ betv/een the USSR and Finland.
An explanation of the abused v/ord, Finlandization , v/ill
serve both to define some terras and to illustrate a key Fin-
nish nersriective toward the Soviet Union.
Out of V/orld Vfar II came the Finnish nhilosonh:^ of
nuttin<T foreign nolicy before domestic concerns as a m.atter
of survival. ^./hile Finland's neutrality-' is dictated by
necessitv, it is also based on the nerceived national interest
and sunnorted by most of the constituents. The basis for this
sunnort is embodied in the most important single factor im-
pacting on Soviet-Finnish relations: President Urho Kekkonen.
He has been the leader of the Finnish neoole since 1955 and
v;as reelected to six additional years on 16 January 1978 by
an overvihelminq ma.iority. An avid sportsman at the aqe of 78,
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Kelckonen skis and hunts v/ith the enthusiasm of a man half his
a'^e . His vitality is nresent in his leadershin a.nd dinlomacy
alike. To endure the three decades of oolitical life he has
been throu.^^h v/ould be notev/orthy in itself. Yet Kekkonen has
risen to leadership of not onl;^"- his ov/n nec-^le, but nlays a
sicrnificant role on the international scene.
Urho Kekkonen became involved in nolitics as a member
of narliament and served as Minister of Justice and Interior
Drior to ^.-orld V/ar II. Finland's post-v/ar actions v/ere dic-
tated extensively by the Soviets throucrh the imnosition of
vast v/ar reparations, as v/as mentioned previously. Thou^rh
Finland emerged a loser in 1944, she still retained her inde-
pendence, ^reserved her constitutional system and ^'/as not
sub.iected to foreip:n occunation forces. As a member of Presi-
dent Paasikivi's cabinet, Kekkonen v/as intimately involved
in restorinq relations v/ith the Soviet Union. The aim of
this nost-v/ar anoroach to foreign nolicy './as to establish a
firm basis of trust v;ith both the Soviet Union an'' Scandinavia,
a nolic'A kno';;n as the Paasikivi Line. Doctor Kekkonen formed
his first cabinet in March of 1950 and functioned as Prime
Minister until his election as President in 1956, an office
he has held v;ithout interruntion ever since.
This brief cansule of Finnish history since '-'orld V'ar II
should serve to shov/ v;hat a vital role I'ekkonen has olayed in
developing contemporary Finnish foreign policy, particularly
v/ith resDect to the Soviet Union.
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Kekkonen also recofrnizes the imnortance of nersonalities
in conducting; foreign oolicy. He nrides himself on the friends
he has on the v;orld DOlitical scene and considers it "extremely
imnortant to fret to knov; the persons responsible for the
nolitical leadershin of another country." ' He has consis-
tently demonstrated his adherence to this trust in dealing
vrith leaders of his eastern neighbor from Stalin to Brezhnev.
The Soviet orientation tov/ard personalities combines v;ith
Kekkonen ' s personal ability to make him an essential *:)art of
Finnish neutrality. "That President Kekkonen has fulfilled
his task in a masterly m.anner is undeniable; as he himself
once had occasion to remark, in his contacts v/ith Soviet leaders
17he has never relinnuished his nation's di^-nity." It is dif-
ficult to overstate the imnortance of Kekkonen as an indivi-
dual in Finnish foreiqn oolicy in -general, but most esnecially
in the rannort he has attained in dealinq '.-/ith the !Crem.lin.
Soviet domination often manifests itself in economic
terms. The object of the USSR's attention is often subjected
to the im.nosition of economic der^endence in critical areas.
This characteristic is orevalent throuc^hout Eastern Eurone
v/ith the majority of the energy flov/in^ from east to v;est
behind the Iron Curtain. Finland was also a victim of this
denendence but has demonstrated an increasincr indenendence
commensurate v^ith her emierqino: nosture. Finnish trade v;ith
the Soviet Union has increased from 1954 v/hen it comorised
18% of the total to the current levels (1977) of 20%."^^
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Hov/ever, this slight increase is not considered indicative
of greater dependence hut rather symtomatic of the ailing-
nature of Finland's econony in <];eneral. For example, the
forest industry nroducts v/hich comnrise over half of Finland's
exports, have been in low demand in the ^^est.
Trade provisions are contained in the Treaty of Friend-
shin, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA, Aonendix A)
and also, a remainder of the harsh nrovisions of the v;ar
indemnities. These, hov/ever, fall far short of the sort of
constraints that would dictate deoendence on the Soviet
Union.
The one area that ties Finland to the Soviet Union econo-
mically is enerqy. At the onenin'^ ceremonies of Finland's
first nuclear oov/er olant in March 1977, President Kekkonen
conceded that fully 70*^^ of Finland's ener'^y resources are
imported and that the Soviet Union is the focal ooint of this
19
suonlv. nevertheless, just as the Finns realize the si::ni-
ficance of their dependence, so do the;"- reco";nize the need
to develon alternate sources. The strenp-th of Soviet levera'-^e
is decreasin^^ as resources are depleted and as international
markets become more onen to Finland. Finland, and to a lesser
extent, the East European nations are drav/inr?, a^'.^ay from energy
dependence on the Soviet Union. Also, future obli-^ations in
trade pacts concerning manufactured goods reflect increases
in total dollar value, but no mention of net increases in per-
centages of imr^orts are made. As a result, the Finns are
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successfully shifting av;ay from the uneconomical asnects of
relationshios v/ith her eastern neii;hbor to the com-^etitive
and more orofi table markets of the v/est.
As com^licatei. and contradictory as Finnish political
histor^'' is, clearly the underlying motif has alv;ays been ad-
herence to indenendence and peaceful coexistence." In this
nuest Finland has recognized the qrov/in.o; ornortunities for
?1
small countries to intluence international nolitics."
The seemincr concurrence and oarallel viev/s held by the
Soviet Union and Finland belie a vastly different motivation
in many areas. Extensive m.ilitary buildun in Lanland is
.justified to I-Ioscov; as defense ac:ainst the imoerialist v/estern
v/orld. In reality there is onlv one conceivable nur^ose for
Finnish forces beinT moved to v;here they are - to resist an
incursion from the east. ^.^hat rioscov; viev;s as ever-increasinq;
dependence is vie^'/ed as just the onrosite b^'- outsiders.
The nerceotion of increased flexibility by the Finns
is exercised nuite moderately v;ith little overt demonstration
of chan-^^e in nolicv. Such things as the nev; emnhasis on the
strateo;ic nature of Lanland is a demonstration of the vrillin^;-
ness of the Finns to express their security drives.
Defense expenditures oronosed for the next five years
shov/ some increases in all areas (See A^nendix B). This,
however, does not reflect all of the defense related perinheral
pro<7rams v/hich account for significant contributions to the
vrhole effort. For examnle, the labor budget orovides for
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millions of Finnish marks to be snent on militar"" construction
under the ausDices of a oro-rrarn to 'gainfully ernnlov seasonal
22
v/orkers, oarticularlv in Laoland. The end result is si'-ni-
ficantly expanded facilities such as barracks and trainin.q
areas v^ith no cost accountincr attributed to defense s'lendin'^ -
a sensitive area in the Soviet's eyes.
It is clear that Finland is interacting v;ith the VJestern
v.'orld to a i^reater degree all the time. Hovrever, vrhether or
not the motive can be attributed to the Soviets' military
concentration of activity in the Kola Peninsula is doubtful.
In snite of the seemingly steadfast nature of Finnish neu-
trality, there is considerable v/avering in response to her
eastern neighbor's forei'^n oolic^'. As has been pointed out,
consideration of Finland's securitv could allov/ for nothing
else as the nrime motivator. The Finns are ouick to "null
the 3ear's beard" on occasion and -oush to the limit on speci-
fic issues, having develoned a keen sense of hov; far and on
what issues she can extend herself.
No matter hov; much the geographic and historical factors
serve to dictate Finland's direction, there is an obvious
aversion to allov/ing Soviet influence to further encroach
on the Finnish v/ay of life.
Finland's nartic ination on the United nation's Security
Council, a Finnish candidate (Mr. Max Jakobson) for secret^.ry
general of the United nations, the Finns hosting the Conference
of Security and Coooeration in Furone , and a free trade deal
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v/ith the European coinmunity , all r^oint to an emer^in^ neutral
state, fully canable of standincr on her ov/n . In summary, "it
is hard... to find evidence of Soviet intervention in the Finns'
essentially democratic political life."'"
An annrooriate analogy of the relationship that Finland
has v/ith the Soviet Union is denicted by the harmonious court-
shio of the hinpo by the tickbird, "tenuous, but mutually
24
rev/ardinfT" . Finland is not in a. position to nursue radi-
cally different alternatives, even v;ith the oerceived increased
nov/er of small nations mentioned nreviously. Finland is con-
tent to onerate v/ithin the framev/ork of the established insti-
tutions and as has been nointed out, has enjoyed a hi^h measure
of success.
Finland has altered her forei'^n rolic"^'" as v/ell as her
self-defense, but only in so far as it is necessarv to accom-
olish the <7oal of keenin<:^ the peace. The consistency of
purr^ose that has been follov/ed under the dominant leadership
of Kekkonen has meen matched by the flexibility necessary to
25live as neighbors of the Soviet Union. No radical shifts
in the Finnish anoroach to either her domestic or interna-
tional affairs is anticinated. The Finns -/ill continue to
quietly achieve results through their nolicy of active neu-
trality and Finland v;ill nersist as the nrime examnle of the
success story of Yalta.
^.^hat then, can the victims of Soviet hegemony learn from
the success of the Finns? In snite of the unique nature of
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each country's circumstances and the nature of Soviet domi-
nation, and at the risk of over-simnlif'-'in^ the issues,
there are common characteristics v;orth notin'-^. First and
foremost, President Kekkonen's examole of ^-finning the confi-
dence of the Krem.lin must be follov/ed in order to have credi-
bility in dealing v/ith the Soviets. Sacrifices of priorities
m.ay have to be made such as substitutin,^ satisfaction of short
term domestic ^^oals v;ith achievement of lon-^er ranQ;e foreic^n
oolicy objectives. The countries of eastern EuroDe cannot
afford to be totally introsnective if the-^ seek to emer.qe
from under the shadov; of Soviet domiination.
By .raininq the Kremlin's confidence the Finns v;ere
successful in removin.!? the physical nresence of the Soviet
forces from v/ithin their borders. Given the nreceived threat
to the Soviet Union from other fronts such as China, it should
be clear that the precedent established by the extensive
duration of occuoation by Soviet forces is not irreversible.
The rem.oval of this hio'hl:,'' visible nresence of no'.'/er v/ould
[^o a lon.f^ v;ay tov;ard compensating the far-si^rhted leader for
any dom.estic short falls.
Finally, the East Euronean leader v;ith a view toward
increased autonomy v^ithin realistic oarameters v/ill seek to
achieve economic indenendence by exnandinq trade with the
West. Limited advances in this direction have received tacit
aooroval as the USSR increases her v/estern trade as v/ell.
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The final su>^1ect to be dealt v;ith in this chapter is
the scenario of Soviet incursion tov/ard the boundaries of
NATO on the northern flank. To date the Nor^'/e^ians have ke^t
the nartici^ation of the Federal Renublic of Germany in
exercises conducted v/ithin her boundaries to a minirnun out
of consideration for the perceived threat from the Soviet
Union. V/ith the increased imDOrtance of the northern flank
area, the level of involvement of all NATO members, to include
VJest Germany, v/ill doubtlessly rise, '-niether the Kremlin's
consent is solicited or their annroval assumed, the element
of risk that a reaction by the Soviets vy-ill take nlace is
si,::nificant . The invokinq of article tv/o of the Treaty of
FCriA. v;ith Finland could certainly be an ontion the Soviets
v/ould consider, for it '/ould provide the onnortunity for a
trem.endous sho'.-; of force all aloncr the Norv/eqian-Finnish
borders. The reaction of the Finns to such a m.ilitary incur-
sion is quite r^ossibly discounted by the Soviets, but the
likelihood of Finland resistin-^ in hopes of qainin-^ v/estern
suDport is increasingly nrobable as the Finns level of inter-
action v;ith the v/estern v/orld increases. Given the Nor'.'/e^ian
disposition and geographic position, NATO forces could v/ell
be auick to accept a Finnish invitation to meet the Soviet
challenge on v;hat is literally neutral territory. This v/ould
provide NATO v/ith a m.uch stronf^er '^osition from, v/hich to mieet
the threat and v;ould nrovide the ontion of folding the Finns
into the nrotective shield of NATO and reestablishing the
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state of active neutrality v/hich exists no^,-;. Assuninr the
thesis of this Daoer is len;itinate - that the Finns are in-
creasincrlv inclined tov;ard the ••/est - they v;ouin solicit
tIATO's intervention and the Soviet Union v;ould he forced into
a no-^'in situation short of initiatin,':^ a ^^lobal conflict.
In summary, the sic^nificance of Europe's northern flank
vrarrants serious consideration, and the role of the Finns
cannot be dismissed as that of just another Soviet satellite.
Far fromi bein^^ dominated by the Soviet Union, Finland lea.ds




'.•/hen CSCE convened in Helsinki in July of 1Q75, Finland
demonstrated to the v/orld v/hat most have been too busy to
take notice of: this small nei~hbor of the Soviet Union v/as
on its v;ay to the culmination of a foreign nolicy line v.'-hich
had taken it from: beinrr a beaten Axis ally in 1945, to a free
nation nlayin^ an active role in '/.'orld politics in s-oite of
its n-eoqranhic constraints. President Kekkonen hailed the
holding of the final staqe of the CSCE as "a significant de-
monstration of the confidence and resoect enjoyed by Finland's
1
neace seeking, active oolicy of neutrality." VT:iat Finland's
position is and ho'.-r it lot there is imnorta.nt.
In one len^rthy sentence "^-eor^ie Maude sum.s ud v/hat m.ost
v;estern statesm.en •.•.'ould aqree is a valid assessment of Finland's
nosition
:
The dilemma that the Finns face is that the closer they
come in a conflict situation to the Soviet side, the
more likelv it is that thev -/ill simnly be included in
hostile action from the v/estern side, v/hile on the other
hand if the Soviet leaders once feel that there is anv-
thin,^ the least unreliable in the Finnish attitude, re-
taliation fromi the Soviet side v;ill occur. 2
V/hat v/ould appear on the surface to be an untenable nosi-
tion has, in most resnects, become one of increasino- stability
follov/in'^ Finland's oolicy of active neutrality. The -^umose
of this chanter is fourfold: 1) to demonstrate the deliberate
nature of Finnish forein;n oolicv as something-, considerably
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nore than submissive, 2) to show hov; ^resident Kekkonen has
develoned this foreign 'oolicy and dis'^lav the vital role
Kekkonen has nlayed in his nersistent pursuit of strenc^thenins;
Finland's position, 3) to speculate on the applicability of
this unique approach to other countries, and finally 4) to
tie these elements into a comprehensive viev/ of Finlandization
.
The approach that v/ill be talcen is to briefly summarize
from chapter t'./o hov/ Finland crot to "/here she was in 19'44,
and then to trace Kekkonen • s involvement in directing: the in-
ternational affairs of Finland. Out of this analysis of three
decades of one m.an ' s statesmanship, a determination '-/ill be
made as to v/hether a deliberate pattern of foreign policy is
present and v/hether or not Kekkonen' s ^oals have been realized.
Beyond the obvious implications this has for Finland's future,
the conclusions v/ill also include an appraisal of the potential
of Finland's foreign policy as a model for other small pov/ers
to follov/.
The historical and o;eon;raphical basis of this analysis
should not be taken as reliance on a relatively simple concep-
tualization of a terribly complex issue. Kekkonen himself
admits that "excessive emphasis on rieo-^raphical factors and
3historical analo'^ies can lead to false oversimplification,"
At the same time it is important to have an appreciation for
the harsh realities of the situation.
There are many aspects of Finland's position v/ith respect
to the Soviet Union that are unique. Perhaps the m.ost
42

si.qnificant of the individual facets of the Finns is the his-
torical experience, the autonomous nature of vrT^ich is in such
sham contrast to that of the Russians. Combined 'vith this
are the unalterable facts of Pieoqranhy, Duttincr t-;o nations
of v/idely diverse back'irounds to-^ether on an extensive (750
mile) border. Thou'-^h not unique in itself, in the context
of a Euronean scenario Finland is the onlv European nation
in such a nosition to have avoided Soviet domination.
Finland also has a consistent history of stron--^ resis-
tance in the face of Soviet intervention "vhich a^^ain dis-
tinguishes the Finns from her nei ^hborin-T; Baltic States and
the minim.al attemnts at discourao;inq Soviet intervention dis-
nlayed in war ravaqed Eurc-ie in the late 1940' s, as "/ell as
Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1963.
The durability of the Russo-Finnish Treaty of Friendshin,
Cooneration and Mutual Assistance is also sinqularl*'" notable
as no other nation in Eastern EuroTie has adhere' to their
original oact or fulfilled all v;ar idemnities to the Soviet
Union.
Finally, v/ith the exception of Yugoslavia, no other
Suronean nation has had the continuity of leadership that
President Keklconen's long tenure has lent to the stability
of Finland. Ironically, no other Euronean nation has had
its name verbalized to nortray Soviet hegemony, a notion this
thesis '.'/ill analyze in deoth.
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On the surface, Finland's uninue characteristics "/ould
seem to invalidate iron the start any -potential con^arison
for -t-urnoses of usin'^ Finland as a model. Aocroachin^ the
nroblem in .f^eneral terms may hel-^ to resolve some of these
peculiarities. For examnle, the si-^nificance of the qeo.Tra-
phical factor can be assessed from three oersDectives : local,
4
regional and ?^lobal security problems.
The nroblem of the defense of Leninp;rad has involved
Finland in the local security issue for centuries. As Peter
the Great's "Windov.'- to the V/est," control of the ar.nroach
over the Karelian Isthm.us from Finland \;as deemed essential.
This issue v/as finally resolved in 1940 after the '/inter "ar
v;;qen the Soviets absorbed this area v;hich formerly constituted
12<;-^ of Finland.
Of increasin^Tly 'greater im.'Tiortance from the regional
noint of vie^r is the securit^^ of the Soviet Union's v;arm --.'ater
Dorts on the Artie Ocean. This is inse::arabl:;'- linked to the
{global ners^ective as one of the v/orld's lariest sinc^le con-
centrations of military mi,'^ht has been built un in the Kola
5Peninsula. This area had been an issue in the si-rnin^ of
the Treaty of Tartu as the security of the Murmansk railroad
arose. Since 1913 the channiing nature of strate-ic doctrine
and the increased level of technolo'':- have combined to empha-
size the significance of this reyion tremendously. The extent
to v;hich this regional asnect of securit'.^ has m.erged into the
c^lobal nerspective has had a nrofound imoact on Finnish
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re.'^ional security and nerhaps even on local security. The
historical back.'^round covered in Chapter II and the detailed
assessment of the strate'-^ic si'^nificance of the Kola Peninsula
in Chanter III should serve to sun^^ort this statement.
In summary, the ':;;eoT:ranhical relationshin of both Finland
and the Soviet Union has been comnounded significantly by the
introduction of Soviet buildun in the Kola Peninsula.
If there is one thread of continuity to both Finnish
foreif^n DOlicy and Soviet-Finnish relations in narticular, it
is the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Coo-ieration and Kutual
Assistance. This relatively concise document consistin'- of
ei^rht articles, nlays a dominant role in many segments of
both domestic and international politics in Finland. As
':>ointed out in the historical bacl'^round of Chanter II, it is
the DOint of reference for r.any of President Kekkonen's ex-
Dressions on foreiqn nolicv, v;hich v;ill be dem.onstrated later,
as v/ell as the touch-stone for the Kremlin in exoressin'^
their dissatisfaction v;ith the Finns.
Were the si=?nificance of any one article of this treaty
to be accorded dominant imnortance it v/ould be article tv;o.
This is primarily on the basis of its having; been invoked
several times durin.o; the last three decades, callin,'^ for con-
ferences in resnonse to a nerceived threat to the security
of the area. Since the Finns never ca.lled for conferences
of this nature, it ^.'.-ould be safe to say the threat v;as one
4k

perceived by the Soviets. These inst;ances of crises nc^^otia-
tions -vill each be discussed later.
A second basis of judn;inn; the si'^nificance of narticular
segments of this treaty v;ould be the ajnount of time invested
in draftin.n; them. Obviously this is bound to reflect the
imnortance of the issues of 1948 as onnosed to contemnorary
priorities. Puttino; the relevance of current issues aside
for the moment, the over'vhelmin^ maioritr/- of the treaty vrrltlwi,
time v/as in fact snent in formulatinf? the first tv/o articles
of the treaty. As the current Undersecretar-' of State out it
in v;ritin<< about the treat;'^, both Finland and Russia:
explicitly and particularly discussed the military arti-
cles of the draft treaty - the first and second articles.
A qreat deal of v/ork v;as done on them, they '-fere preci-
sioned and thev v/ere the ob,-iect of Ion:? ne'-^otiations
.
Their deta.ils v/ere clarified and efforts '.vere made to
ensure that there v^ould be as little snace as possible
for interpretation and speculation .7
Some contend that Finland's political leadership has
•-fenerally tried to be included by both the Great ?ov;er blocs
in the '^^roup of neutral countries. ' The primary recuirement
for lerritimate consideration as a neutral fluctuates from a
strictly lecral internretation of refraining; from involvement
in v;ars betv/een other states to a philosophical outlook '•/hich
9
establishes "an unshakable desire for neutralit;^^" as the
basis of neutral status.
Man';' point to the FCMA as the source document that vio-
lates any internretation of neutralitv. The fact of the matter
is that technically there is no oblifiation for Finla.nd to assist
4^

the Soviet Union unless an attack against the USSR is ^er-
10
oetuated throu.'^h r inland. Mo^: realistic is it to viev;
a NATO attack on the northern flank? Hardly the raost -Dlau-
sible of scenarios. The examination in Chanter II of each
instance t/hen consultations v;ere called for under the pro-
visions of FCIL'\ served to clarify this.
Kekkonen has trained confidence from havin,? bided his
tim.e in the "Nio;ht Frost" ne^-otiations . The fact that he vfas
in Hav.'aii '.'hen the "T^ote Crisis" arose com.bined v/ith the reas-
surance he had received durin^ his just completed visit '.vith
President Kennedy made Kekkonen decide to subdue the crisis
bv not treatin'7; it as one. He nla''"ed the theme he had ar~ued
throu';7hout his tour of the United States to the hilt: Finland
had nothing to fear from the Soviets for relations '-/ere sound.
'/hen Kel:l-onen returned home a ''/eek later he continued
to emnhasize the success of Finland's nolicy of neutrality
and persisted in dov;n-n laying; any talk of a Finnish crisis
';ith the Soviets. Instead he nointed the finder at the '/es-




T'That should be remeribered v/hen lookin'7 at these neriods
of crisis is that the forei'^n nolic'' that resolved them v;as
developed over a lonq period of tim^e. Kekkonen ' s foreign
policy is not just an extension of I^aasikivi ' s . As Minister
of o^ustice and five-time Prime ?'Iinister, Kekkonen v;as thorou-^hl-'-
involved in the structuring^ of Finland's future for a decad?
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prior to beinq elected President in 195G. In essence, Xek-
konen is nost '.orld '•.ar II foreign nclicy.
To reiterate the conclusions reached in Chapter II con-
cerning; the role of Finland's President in Quellino; the
"Nic^ht Frost" crisis, Kekkonen's first stens v/ere to remind
the Finnish neoDle of the nricritv of foreinrn DOlicy over do-
mestic considerations. He leaned heavily on the v;ords of the
ponular Paasikivi v;hom he had recentlv succeeded: "Our foreign
DOlicy can henceforth never run counter to the Soviet Union
and our Eastern neicrhbor must be convinced of our determ-ina-
12tion to Drove this."
Pointing then to the "successful nrov.^th of this nolicy,
Kekkonen cited the return of the Porkkala enclave as its
crov/nin'^ achievement." " Then, after a short dir^ression into
the effects of overexercisin'^ one's freedom of speech, Kek-
konen outlined the ,q;lobal tensions v/hich had nromuted the
Soviets to call for consultations.
V/hat the President did v/hen he v.'-ent to the Soviet Union
five m.onths after this sneech v/as given is cle3.r as far as
results go. Kekkonen returned, follo'-'ed closely by the re-
turn of the Soviet Ambassador to Helsinki signaling the end
of the "Night Frost," Restraint in the nress v;as once aTain
called for by Kekl'onen to build un the dejrree of confidence
14




In resolviTT^ the I^Iote Crisis, Presi'ient Kekkonen embarked
on his personal 'li vlomac;^'" v;ith the Soviet leader once a^rain
after chastisinp; Finland's rir^ht \-:±nrr front for failin<3: to
15
convey the confidence of the Finns in their foreiqn policy.
This sort of deviation from the established nolicy v;ould sur-
face ao-ain to hinder Kekkonen 's efforts to build confidence
and attemnt to erode the foundation of the FCIIA Treaty.
In 1976 a book vras published in the Soviet Union that
offered a verv disturbin.f^ interoretation of the direction of
Finland's forei.r^n Dolicv. From the Finnish oers'^ective the
book v/as a slap in the face from ""lOscovi v/ho had been ner-
ceived as a loyal friend. ilost regarded the book as simnly
a "nev/ edition of a book already published in Finnish" b^/ the
same author in 1974. ' The distur^in-^ nature of the ne^.'' edi-
tion v;a3 that the tracing of histor:* led to a conclusion that
President Kekkonen and his predecessor , Paasilcivi, had tried
to distort the meanin,'^ of the 1948 FCIIA Treaty.
The crux of the Soviet fears expressed in the book v/ere
that the military cooT^era.tion clauses of the treaty v;ere
bein^T obscurred by Keklconen's emoha.sis on neutrality. From
the Finnish nersr^ective there v/as never a basis for such
Soviet susnicions. Through the eyes of Ilax Jakobson the Dur-
pose of the Komissarov book v/as lust the o'^j'^osite: "to obscure
Finnish neutrality by em-Dhasizing the military articles of
the FCI'lA. Treaty." ' Jakobson further speculates that the
eventual aim of the Soviets is to obtain a binding alliance
v/ith Finland to replace the FCM/i Treaty. ^
49

One must conclude from the dialcue that the problem is
a deterioration of the trust and confidence so carefully
built un by the Finns. The abilit;"- of Kekl:onen to nlacate
the Soviets as he had done so many times nreviously serves
to reinforce Finland's role on t"70 counts. First, the Soviets
g;ot the Finns to snsv/er for their actions -.•/hether --^uilty or
not, thus reestablishing that the Finns kno'.7 their olace and
that the Kremlin is in control of the situation. Secondly,
the Finns have succeeded in not only bolstering; the Soviets'
confidence in their control, but have reinforced world o-oinion
that Finland is beinp; "Finlandized" - thus oerr-etuatin,'^ the
circle of forces v/hich allov; President Kekkonen to increase
the latitude of his ^olic,^ of active neutrality.
Evidence of this is seen in tv:o events v;hich took nlace
v/ithin one v;eek in May 1977. At a IIoscov; dinner hosted by
Brezhnev, the address to the Tatherin^ for I'.ekkonen -^iven by
the Soviet leader reaffirm.ed that there -..-ere no animosities
and denied any loss of confidence in Finland. " One -•eek latei
Kekkonen received the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
in Helsinki; the first visit bv a tc^-rankin^^ United States
military/ commander since the end of './orld V.'ar II. In the
20
,iudq;ment of many it was a rather daring move by Kekkonen,
but v/as justified in the Finns' eyes by the si.fT;ning of the
East-V/est declaration.
The aur- that t]~iis relationshin bet-^een the Soviet Union
and Finland be'^ins to take on can be confusing indeed. On the
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one hand, it would anpear that the Finns have 5:one out of
their '/ay to Dlacate the Russian Bear in times of crises and
have made concessions almost to the noint of subservience.
Conversely, President Kekkonen has nersiste I in ^ursuin'^ a
policy v/hich is obviously contrary to the desires of the
Soviets. Unfortunately, it is the former characterization
v;hich seems to .--^et all of the attention under the catchy code
v/ord, Finland! zation . It may be useful to look at the ori'^ins
of this v/ord and thereby ^ain a further understanding; of both
V.festern mis-imnressions and '.-/hat they may mean to Finland.
The nature of ti^e v/ord Finlandization defies strict
definition as evidenced b;.'' the ''/ide ran~e of interpretation
annlied to it. •Jha.t Piere Hasner labels "a miilder and more
^1
modern form of Sovietization" is tlie same thin"- that Krosb;''
22defines "reconciling, one's differences 'vith the Soviet Union."
Likev/ise, there exists a similar diver^^ence of vie'.'/s betv/een
Kekkonen v/ho siminlv savs that the Finns don't deserve this
label, that it is incorrect and uniust; and Richard Lov/enthal
v/ho uses Finlandization to replace Commiunization as the Soviets'
23
cjoal toward '.''est Germany.
Re'?;ardless of the ori~ins of the v/ord, the focus of this
thesis will be on '-/hat it currentl--'' defines. This is not
comnletelv disreqardinq the si'^nificance of the coinin<^ of
the vrov^ to anply to "snineless acceptance of Soviet dom.ina-
24
tion,"' or to if-^nore the implications that use of this elusive
\/ord have had for other Eastern and ^.''estern Euror^ean nations.
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Rather, it is an ptteni^t to anal/'ze hov; the innressions con-
veyed throu'-'h the Soviet Union iTave innacted on the Russo-
Finnish relationshin
.
It v/ould be easy to say that the Soviets have been obli-
vious to the imnact of V/estern opinion on this relationship
\":ith Finland. In fact, the end result of this viev; is not
totally false: that Finland is and has been a shov/case of So-
viet peaceful coexistence is definitely a nart of v;hat consti-
tutes this reasonabl:' harmonious relationshin. Because a nor-
tion of realitr'- in both narties' eyes is cantured in this
assessment, and because it is not terribly comnlex, many analysts
are nuick to embrace v/hat this author v;ould .I'ud^^e too sim.plis-
tic a notion.
The internretation that this thesis is attemntinq; to sun-
'^ort is that included in the very deliberate nursuit of a
foreign "olicv of active neutralit-.^ is the effective a.nd al-
most in-^enious ex'-'loitation of '-."estern oninion bv Finland to
,q;ain increased autonomv. Unfortunately, to -^rove such an
h;''nothesis conclusively v/oiild necessitate the admission by
Kekkonen that the Finns do in fact use '/.Western oninion to im-
nlement their foreign oolicy. Certainlv such an admission
v;ould not be forthcoming since it vould defeat the very nurnose
of this a'-^nroach. Instead the sunnort v/ill be in v;hat in




To be-^in ••.'ith, a '^rief lool' at the antithesis of this
conceptualization may helo to reinforce the credibility of
this notion of "reverse risvcholo'-r^,'-. " If in fact the Finns
do consider the tern, Finlandization , a.nd its use to be deri-
sive in nature, v;ould not their solution be to refute the
misconception by nresentin-^ suonortin^ factual data? Cer-
tainly it v/ould not he difficult to build an effective case
for Finnish autonomv, narticularlv through comparison to any
of a number of East European states. One of the more v.'idely
oublicized versions of sucb. a d.isclaimer has '^een extracted
from the Scandinavian Revievy and is v.-idel*'' distributed, b'ritten
by H. l^eter Xrosby, it offers the varietv of definitions of
Finlandization nreviouslv mentioned and ^^oes on to out forth
the Finnish internretation
.
The net effect, hov;ever, of a Finnish -^overnr.ent dis-
claimer such as Krosbv '-.'rote voul "'. be to call attention to
a situation that the Soviets v;ould find more than a little
embarrassin'T . b^hat 'DOlicy -/ould ensue is an-'-one ' s f^uess, ''ut
it is safe to say it v/ould have a ne'^ative impact on the Finns'
nursuit of active neutralit^^.
Returning to tl>e orip;inal vie'-" t'nat ":;^..e Finns ar? effec-
tively usinq negative b'estern c-'inion in their favor, it is
possible to envision tvro v:ays that this circum.stance could
have been arrived at: hannenstance or intentionallv . For the
original pursuit to have been intentional v;ould have reouired
a vast and deliberate nromiotion of their cause v/hile staa;in7,
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an even stron'T;er o^^osition viev,^ noint throuq;h a diverse cross
section of v/orld press. Tluch more -olausible is the notion
tiiat the Finns v/ere clever enouqh to ca'::'italize on the all
too ouick con'Ieinn?.tion of ''estern nress journalists. Kennan's
viev/ is that:
...the Finns have conducted themselves vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union v;ith a remarkable dignity, v/ith cool nerves
and com.DOsure, and v;ith a '^uiet but firm and successful
insistence on t'-.e rio;ht to lead their ovm lives, inter-
nally, after their ovm fashion and in accor-''' '.vith their
ovm orincinles. In no vrav have the^.^ deserved to be held
un as the exami-'le of a humiliating; su':'Servience to a
lar'^er nov/er.^^
It v;ould be in keeninp; v;ith the Finns' stoic an^^roach
to such matters to initially not even recognize the slander-
ing of their 70od name and to cuietlv discount it as the shal-
lovf internretation of their '-^osition that it is. Then it v/as
a simnle matter to let the nress ramble on v.'ith this fancy
nei'i v;ord in their vocabular;''" v;ith each use further convincing
the Kremlin of their overv/helm n^ control of their "shov/case"
in the north.
An element of this evolution of foreign policy alluded
to e.arlier in the context of Kekkonen's resolution of the
"Nicrht Frost" crisis is freedom of sneech in Finland. '^hile
the Finns v;ould tell ^'ou that they have a nress v;ith a sense
of resnonsibility about criticism of sensitive issues, '-Wes-





Certainl;';' there are forces i'7orl:in'T afrainst a totally
free Finnish nress, the nrimar^' ones bein^^ from ''/ithin the
Soviet Union. Usually only the strongly '••"orded accusations
of Tass an-'' "i^ravda ap-^ear in the '-'estern nress. A flurry
of such articles anneared in the snrinq; of 1975 startin'^ vfith
Pravda alle'Tin^^ an anti-Conmunist camnaifrn vras under '.''ay.
The banter back and forth over the internal nolitics accuses
Mosco'.-/ of nrornotin^ the cause of minorit'^ Stalinists and
Tass resT^ondin^ v/ith v/arnin^s about reactionary forces in
26Finland.
Other threats to the freedom of the '^ress come from
^rithin as factions of the Finnish p-overnrnent attempt to in-
nose econoriiic pressures throuc;h nress subsidiaries. The
risk becomes then that only narty-affiliated napers v/ould
27
CTet sur-3ort.
The effects of these soviet out'---,;rsts make the Finnish
politicians aj./are of the fact that they are treadino; on sen-
sitive issu-^s close to the mar'-^-in of toleration. For the
sake of Finland's survival, certainly this must be considered
a nositive asnect of the overall issue. 'v^hether this benefit
offsets the costs incurred by way of sus'^icion of one's oi"n
nrinted matter is for the Finns to decide. Our ov;n values
cannot '-e im-'^osed on the drastically different situation of
the Finns; nor is it the 'Durnose of this thesis to malce iud^:-
ments on the moralitv of Finland's dom^estic nolitics. It is
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safe to conclude that the government does effectively im::)Ose
some restrictions on the nress, but v/hat froverniTient , includin.o;
the United States', doesn't? To differentiate bet-reen v;hat
is self-im.nosed out of a sense of resnonsibility and v;hat
results from 'government intervention is impossible exceot in
the most extreme situations.
In one of the more recent v;or-cs concern'^ "". ';! t'l Fir,lan '1-
zation, editors Ginsbur,Q;s and Rubinstein nrefaced a collection
of essays by citin'^ as one of their objectives "to exsmine the
utility of the often mentioned but little analyzed notion of
"Finlan'':''ization" as a -possible exnlanation of Iloscovf's stra-
2 8
te.'^ic desi=-n for dealing v;ith '/estern ^aro-oe."
'-/hile a thorou'^h examination of this nuestion is be^'-ond
the scone of this thesis, the frsjnev/ork for anal'^sis certainl',^
lends itself to this study. Seven characteristics are outlined
by Ginsbur^s and Rubinstein v/hich v/ill serve as our noint of
reference for accessin'^;- the notion of Finlandization in terms
of hov; accurately it describes Finland's relations v/ith the
Soviets, In the conclusion an extension of this analysis vriii
be made to reflect on lio'v ar:nrODriate it -/ould be to malce an
analoq;^^ to a central Euronean situation.
The first characteristic, "resoonsiveness in forei'^n
policv to Soviet ^references , " can be dealt v;ith in short
order. '-.'hile decrees of resnonsiveness are subjective in
nature, a response to Soviet oreference is nresent in the
forei<^n policy of any and all countries dealin'^ -vith the

Kremlin. It is a function of the sunernov/er status accorded
Finland's nei-^hbor and by virtue of geo^qraohic realities that
relations v/ith IIoscov; nust be attended to vrith somev;hat f^reater
attention than other small Dov/ers v;ho en.i'oy relative isolation
v:ith resnect to nroximit^•' to a f?;reat Dov/er,
Secondly, "avoidance of alliance v;ith countries deem.ed
by the Soviet Union to be comnetitors or rivals" is a^^ain
relatively simnle to deal v/ith from the Finnish perspective
Finland has no alliances of a militar-/ nature in the strictest
sense of the v;ord and in no interpretation can be vie'.7ed as
seekinq an;-^. The government in Helsinki is indeed '•:ar''' of
an-r alliance, not .-iust v/ith the V/est but, as v/as '-pointed out
earlier in this chanter, nersists in a ver-^*- narrov/ inter^ore-
tation of their only alliance of an;,^ sort: the Treaty of Friend-
ship Coo-oeration and Mutual Assistance.
"Acceptance of neutral it''' in neace or v/ar" is indeed the
ultimate aim of the Finns. In snite of the military clause
of the FCIIA and the Soviet internretations , there is an un-
equivical stand of neutrality maintained by Kekkonen v/hich
has shov/n its v:orth in crisis situations. The only qualifi-
cations attached to this definition of Finnish foreiQ:n nolicy
is the v/ord active, v/hich serves to denict the role the Finns
seek, to nlay in v/orld affairs as a neutral.
The fourth characteristic of Finlandization as defined
bv Ginsburqs and Rubinstein is of particular importance v/hen
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vleviin^, Finland's oosition vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, "Ab-
stention from mernbershiD in re'?ional and international "irour:!-
in-^s considered unfriendly by I-Ioscov;" has hardly been the
approach taken by this thorou.q;hly Nordic country. 31ocl:in.^
of membershin in NORDEC , a oroDOsed Scandinavian economic
organization, is Dointed to by many as an exanrDle of Soviet
influence in Finnish affairs. The actual outcome, however,
v;as in fact a step bv sten imnlementation of the individual
elements of the agreement v.hich in the end constituted an ar-
rangement which was virtually the same result as if the treaty
had been signed. Other Finnish economic arrangements such
as free trade v/ithin the Euronean Economic CommiUnit-'- are fur-
ther evidence of Finnish autonom.y which contradicts this charac-
teristic of Finlandization outright.
Self-censorshin , or as Ginsbur'-^s and Rubenstein define
their fifth characteristic: "restraint over the media in one's
country to muffle or minimize criticism of the USSR, so as
to avoid possible provocation" is anot'ner very sub.iective area.
One rserson in a nosition to evaluate this tonic, Olli I-'.ivinen,
foreign affairs editor of the He Isinqin S an om. at , made an im-
portant distinction betv;een self-censorshin and a resnonsible
nress. The basis of com>narison for Americans is nrima.rilv
our ov/n extremely sensational press, hardly a reasonable
standard. Drawing an analog:/ of the antagonism of the United
States b3/ Canada is not an entirely aooropriate example, but
serves to noint out that even in our coonerative dealings with
5 8

our northern neiq:l-ibors there is an obvious measure of pra.c-
tical restraint exercised v^ithin Canada to avoid unnecessarily
UTsettin- '^ood nei<-:hborly relations. Even Kivinen is v/illinp-
to admit that somie segments of the media, narticularly the
state-run television, ,qo beyond the noint of bein^i; responsible.
This is common knov7led,n;e , ho'/ever, and the opinions expressed
on the TV are trea.ted aco ordinal;"". They are not i'-^nored
entirely, but seldom, are even of a controversial nature. One
mi.^ht alm.ost viev/ the television's na.rty line as a concession
made to the Soviets for the sal:e of retainin'^ a free r>ress.
The last tv;o characteristics of Finlandization are closely
relate'-' and are not viev;ed by this author as ^-/orth m.ore than
'-lassin^ m.ention: 3) "com'oensator;'- vestures in com.mercial and
cultural contacts •/ith the USSR, extending, to treaties and
di-olomatic consultations, to effect disparities in the rela-
tionshin v;ith the USSR on the one hand and ''estern 'iluro^ean
countries on the other and (7) openness to a-netration 'vr Soviet
ideas and media."
If these seven characteristics then constitute Finlandi-
zation, nerhans the Peonies Renublic of China is the only
countrv v.^hich is not Finlandized.
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V. COMIIUniSTS' ROLE IN FINLAND
"There is one countr'/ in v.'-estern Europe vrhere communist
participation in a democratic .^^^ox'ernment is not a matter for
1
wild surmises - but routine." The nurnose of this chanter
is to analyze hov/ the com.munists achieve! this unioue relation-
shin and to determine the role of coalition politics in com.-
munist nercentions and theories as thev have been developed
in Finland. The annroach that v/ill be taken is to trace the
historical develonment of the Finnish Com.munist ?artv as it
evolved from the beqinnin'7 of the t'ventieth century. Secondl:-^,
the cha.racter of the Finnio'i communists v;ill be assessed and
the vle\rs of com.munists ••^ith re,q;a.rd. to thie onnosition and the
other nolitical narties; emnlovin^ cos.lition politics as the
concentual framev/ork. Finally, an attemnt \'ill be made to
estimate anv potential imnact that the Finnish CommAinist
Party could have beyond the scope of the domestic politics
of Finland.
Perhans the most important element the com.munists '".ave
in t'leir favor is the resnect of their fellow Finns for firm.ly
rooted democratic ideals \7hich included respect for minorities.
This v;as the thrust of Karl b^iik's argument in o^nosition to
the attemnts to ban him and his fellov/ narty members from
nartici-'^'ation in Finnish government. Reminders like this al-
lov;ed the comm.unists to canture forty of the tv;o hundred seats
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in the first nost-v/ar i-^arli'jnentary elections, in snite of
tv;o successive bitter defeats suffered ot the hands of the
Red Arny.
"
'.Mthin this relationsh.ip the comr.unist T^arty maintains
in Finland is seen \.'hat could he labeled a microcosn of the
broader scone of the Russo-Finnish relationship . The analogy
beino; that the communists are to the Finnish political system
v/hat the Finns are to the Soviet Union '//ith the key to the
success of both relationships bein^ tolerance, respect for
the lim.its of interaction and trust.
'/hat this analogy enables us to do, -..^ithin reasonable
constraints, is to apnl";^ oertinent nrincinles of action to
each realtionshin and therebv increase the scone of under-
standing in both areas, based on available -:no'^ledQ;e on each.
Accordin'Tiv , reference v;ill be dravm to this analo'~y in 'general
terms throup;hout this chanter.
The Soviets had failed in their overt attemnts to foster
the birth of a communist leadershin after the ''inter b'ar in
1940. The head of the ill-fated punnet c-overnment v/hich the
Kremlin had installed v/as Otto Kuusinen '..'ho had been a close
advisor to Stalin as a 'prominent theoretician of Ilarxism.-
Leninism in the Comiintern. Roth Lenin and Stalin relied on
Kuusinen to nrovide doctrinal justification for their noli-
cies."" Hov; Kuusinen manuevered himself into this nosition
nrovides a lesson in the conseouences of coalition nolitics.
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Before exaTiinirT^ this critical .juncture in the history
of the Finnish Cornmunist Party, it is important to understand
hov/- the communists emer^-ed from the civil v;ar. The roots of
Finnish Socialism can be traced bach into the neriod i/hen
the Finns v;ere a nart of the Russian Grand Duchy, An indus-
trialization of the timber industrv introduced mechanization
and alon.o: v/ith it came labor associations. The Tsar had ini-
tially aDoroved these or'^^anizations in concent in 13R3, and
by 1895 they had evolved into the dem.ocratic socialism, that
4
had been q;rov;in^ throu-^hout Scandina.via
.
The first falterinq stens of this forerunner of the
com.munist narty were interrupted >^y imnosition of the strin-
gent constraints of Russification in 1899. '-^hile the Finns
v/ere united in c-inosition to this infrin'rem.ent on their auto-
nomous traditions, thev '/ere divided on v/hat form their resis-
tance •'-'ould take. Prorosed action covered the s^ectrumi from,
oassive resistance to armed insurrection. Just as Finnish
societv v;as solit on this issue, so too did a schism develoo
v/ithin the Social Democrats. The antagonism betv/een the tv/o
factions surfaced in the 1904 elections and festered until
the snark of revolution erunted as a .(^eneral strike in con-
.lunction v/ith similar events in 1905 in Russia. The ranks of
the Finnish Socialists increased five-fold durin-^ this oeriod
of turmoil, and se^'-eral important nersonalities in Finnish




^reoccu'-'ieH v:ith donestic nro^lems and reo.lizin^ the
Russification effort ^-''a?; failirT^, Nicholas II \7ithdrev; his
edicts and the Finnish cabinet set about establishin™ a diet
reform. Out of this reform arose a unicsjneral le^^islation
v;hich Kuusinen labeled a semblance of a democra.tic institution.
As a left vrino; Socialist leader, Kuusinen continued to -^ress
for reform, advocating; increased r.arlia.mentarv no'.'/er a.nd
inde-^endence from; the Tsar. The inevitable revolution in Rus-
sia v/as anticipated as the time to fulfill the ambitions of
Finnish freedom seekers. The outbreak of '/orld ^-/ar I v/ith its
decematin^ effects on Russia eventually Tave rise to civil
v;ar, an c^nortunity tha.t the Finns toolc axlvanta^e of in order
to crain their indenendence
.
On the road to freedom., the Finns turned to Oermian"' for
assistance, a bid for aid that v/as viev;ed as essential to
breakin'7 av/a^^ from the Tsar. The -rece 'ent established by
the Finns v/as to be a tellin-: one, as future fraternization
v;ith Germany v/ould tra'^icall;^'' comnlicate Finland's relation-
shin v;ith her eastern neiThbor three deca.des later.
After considerable debate './ithin Finnish ranks and
frustrating bar-^ainin-^ '.'ith the nrovisional yovernment in
?etr0'i;rad, civil war erunted in Finla.nd. A new fi-^ure rose
to nrominence as the need for military ex'^ertise v/as a.ns".'ered




Mannerheim' s renutation r^receeried his shift from military
to oolitical life. Dubbed "the aristocrat in politics" by
Rintala in his book, Four Finns
,
he relates tha.t riannerhein
v/as one of the fev; human bein'^s before v/hom Hitler shov/ed any
7
sia;ns of humility after 1933. For a man v/ho came to be I:no\/n
as the "father of Finland," it is somev/hat ironic that as a
consequence of the length of his service in the Imperial Army
Mannerheim snobe Finnish ooorly."' All of the s^^eculation and
debate about the true alle';Tiance of Ilannerheim ' s loyalties,
hov'ever, v;ere dispelled in his staunch defense of his hor:ie-
land. Geor.qe Ivennan put it so suscinctly v;hen he said rian-
o
nerheim v/as "100^' Finnish. "''
In Aoril 1913 Mannerheim led the Finnish '/hites and a
su'-)nortin<? German force of divis.ion size against the Reds and
succeeded in drivinq; the Communist forces out of Finland into
Moscov/, Mannerheim then became head of state onlv to become
embroiled in vet another v;ar '/ith Russia over disnuted terri-
tory in Karelia, the first of several such disputes.
The neace of this conflict ivp.s concluded in the Treat;^
of Tartu by Paasikivi v/ho succeeded in obtainin'7 access to
the Barents Sea for tb.e Finns.
In Jul;' 1919 Karl StahlberT v/as elected ^resident --/ith
an assembly controlled by the tv/o moderate parties (Agrarians
and Prc^ressives) . To f^ain narticination in the .government
the Social Dem.ocrats snlit -fith the com.munists '/ho had been
barred from Finnish politics.
64

The Finnish Reds that survived the brutal fi'^.htin-^ of
the CiA/-il '/.^ar escaoed to the ea.st. Ajc.on'T, them v/as Kuusinen
v.'ho c;uic!-:ly came under tl-^ influence of Lenin's ^-'ritin^s
v;hich caused him to -^ush for the formation of a Finnish Com-
munist Party, Bv-- the end of A.U'Tust this had been accomnlished
in Moscov/.
As the Finns sterned fon/ard as a sovereign nation, they
did so not as novices in self-'-^overnm.ent , but rather with a
considerable democratic tradition. The '-jO^ulation [^rev: by
fifteen 'percent in the t',;enty years nreceedin^ dorld '..'ar II
(3.35 to 3.89 miillion) and the nrimiarily a^ricultura-l economy
10had ninety' '::ercent of the farmers as indenendent ov/ners.'
The expansion of the "social state" v;as evidenced by the in-
stitution of the ei-rht hour day, old a^e , accident and sicl'-
ness insurance, maternitv aid, lec^islation for the care of
11
needy children and '~overnmen~ ov/ned utilities.
Thus, on the eve of the Second 'dorld '-.'ar, Finland's
Communist Party v;as in e::ile, although the s-^irit ferm.ented
in the ranks of the Social Democrats. The initial attem^nts
to reconstitute their position failed, as mientioned earlier.
In SDite of Soviet sunoort, the Finnish oeoTDle successfully
resisted Kuusinen' s comeback. Just four years later, hov;ever,
after the Finns succumbed to Soviet militar'^ mi'~ht in the





The Finnish Communist Party i/as le-^all:;- a part of the
Finnish r-olitical s;"stem. v;ith a le^^itimate base of surmort.
In addressin- the viev:s of the Finnish communists v/ith
reqard to the oonosition and other political parties, the
-"primary source of inform.ation for develo'^in'- the nethodolCTy
an d ty -^ o 1 oTf v;as '/iHi am. H . Hiker's The Theory of Political
Coalition . ''/hile this analysis v/ill not adhere strictlv to
the theories nut forth in this hook, it vrill nrovide the basis
of analysis of the Finnish nolitical scene.
An exam.nle of V.'estern misconce-^tions of the Finnish posi-
tion is nrovided bv Hiker in his book mentioned above. In an
examnie from the section "Politics in an Aqe of "'anuever,"
Hiker noints out that "...the exact nosition of ...Finland...
is somev/hat ambiguous, althour^h the United States acts e,s if
it ex-oects (Finland) to be absorbed ultimately into a Soviet
1'^
alliance." " '/Tiile this miay have been a valid assessm.ent of
the rosition and direction of Finland in 1962, the ''^estern
'/orld's rercention of Finland's nosition has significantly
chancred in the interim. The function of coalition r)Olitics
has nlayed a definite role in this shift to include the noli-
tics of the Finnish Com.munist Party.
Unlike Rik.er's descrir^tion of the evolution of society
in the a-^e of manuever as shifting "in accordance v/ith the
size nrincinle, the v;estern coalition havin-^ diminished and
14the Communist one ( exoandin^) , " the role of the com.munists
in Finland has stabilized. This is demonstrated by the table

of election results in Anrencii:: C ';hich shovjs that the^/ con-
sistently noil t'./enty '-lercent of the vote.
Riker nosits three nain propositions about political
coalitions. V.'ithout qoin^: into a detailed explanation of each
and at the risk of overs in'-^lif-n'.n^ a com-^lex theorv, a brief
summary of each nronosition ^.'ill be put forth for purposes
of arnlication in discussion of the communist -t'arty's role
in Finnish nolitics.
The size nrincinle asserts that "v;ith comnlete and per-
fect information, -.'innin'- coalitions tend to^/ard minim.al
15
v.'innin'T size." Emiohasis for critinue here is •olp.ce'' on
"ideal conditions" ':b.ic'~. selbom orevail, '.rhich I^iker joints
out in his introductory.'' chapter, '/herein he lists four con-
ditions nrerepuisite to anniication of his model. "^' The ten-
denc''' for leaders to "m.iscalculate sidenavm.ents a.nd to nay
m.ore for '.•/innin'^ than './innin':^ is "o'--^,iectivel^^ v.'orth'" has
particular an^^iication to the '-^osition hardliners in the
Finnish-Comm.unist coalition, as v;ill ^e dem.onstrated later.
The stra.te'^^ic Drincinle is the secon'' of Riker' s asser-
tions, nredicated on an operative size nrincinle, v/hich holds
that "narticinants in the final sta-^es of coalition-form.ation
IR
should and do move to'.'.'ard a m.inimum v/inninq coalition."
This nremise v/ill be the basis of some sneculation in the
concludin'T nortions of this chanter v/ith rer;ard to the future
of the Finnish Communist ^art--.
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The final assertion, the dise-!uilibrium principle, is
-TTTedicc^-ted on the size and strategic nrinci'^les '^einT o-^era-
tive. It maintains that "the system.s or honies are t!-.ei.v-":^lv-- :-;
1 o
unstable." An;ain , the relative strenqth of the communists
in Finland's qovernm.ent ''/ill be assessed in this context v/ith
res-oect to the onr^osition
.
The influence of the Soviet Union on the role of the Fin-
nish Com.munist Party certainl'' cannot be discounted. For
"livin-^ on the threshold of the Eastern colossus implies a.
constant shado'/'ino; in domestic and forei'^n affairs.""" The
nature of this influence can tahe on many different ch^iracter-
istics and, oarticularl^/ v;ith re^iard to the Finnish Cor:m.unist
Party, it has done so. The most blatant su-^'^ort v;as the ac-
tual installation of a Com.munist pU':>oet government in 1S40
hea.ded by Otto Kuusinen. Since this miserable failure, overt
Soviet encoura'^ement and backing v.'aned considerabl-% as the
dominant fifrure of Urho Kehlconen prevailed in Finnish -politics
and the Soviet leaders'nip o;ained increa.sini confidence in
dealing v;ith himi . In s-iite of Kehhonen's tenure and the at-
tendant stability this m.i-Tht reflect, the record sho'./s the
government chanoiiir^ an avera-:e of once a year vith the role
of the communists bein,c[ siy,nificant in causiny tb.is tren-\
The nermanent ornosition /hich marked the com.munists'
stand since their failure to ca'^'italize on the onnortunity
presented at the end of the '.^inter '-^ar v;as finally breached
by com^^romise in 19Si". " The communists' involvement in a.
6 8

coalition v^ith the Soviet Democratic ^arty has been the object
of considerable interest. The head of the Socip.l Democra.t3
and Finnish Prime Minister, Kalevi Sorsa, is cuicl: to noint
out the uninue nature of the Finnish nolitic-'il system and the
attendant peculiarities of this coalition. In a.n interview-;
,1ust nrior to the Januarv 1978 elections, Mr. Sorsa reflected
the cautiousness th.at has characterized Finnish -oolitics in
•general out of deference to the Soviet Union, and he cited
the need to cater to Finland's "political circu;asta.nce as a
unifying force.
The Finnish model of cooperation not onl^/ involves the
cooneration of the left but also three narties from, the
':}Olitical center. The basis for cooDeration is '//ider
than in France ?.n " resembles more closely the comrromesso/
storico nattern v;ith the difference, hc'^ever, that in
Finla.nd the Social Democratic Part''- is clearl".' the bi~-
qest and that also the three parties in the center form
a no";er stron'-^er than the Communists , 52
Perhans the most significant reason for resisting com-
-^arison to the other countries as a mo^'el is the risk of ac-
ouirin^ the label of Furocor.m.unist . The difficulty in defininr-
this term, is oointed out by Vernon AsDiturian v/ho cha.racterized
Eurocommunism as difficult to concentualize , dubbin'A it a
"semantic orphan" and an imprecise term. As a product of a.
convenient, iminressionistic label to identify tendencies, it
is m.ore self-critical than substantively'- constructive a.nd has
been attacked at all levels as too narrov/ a concent.
The Tim.es assessm.ent of the Finnish comm.unists' nosition
'•/a.rrants the inclusion of this label in a modified version:
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"Finn-Eurocomnunists . " This nr3jne is anrronriate on the basis
of the reformist nature of their Droqrams and their v;illin7-
ness to won: within .^overnnental structure.
The segment of the Finnish Communist Party that remains
onoosecl to the ohilosonhv of v;orl:in? v;ithin the system a.re
the hardline Stalinists headed by Sarrinen v/ho has been SF.P
(Sucrnen Kom.riunistinen Puolue - Finnish Comimiunist Party) chair-
nan since 1966. The ri-^ht v/in^ and the communist coalition
as a v.'hole v/ere led by Iliettuner from 30 Ilovember 1975 until
29 Seritember 197-S '.-/-hen an economiic crisis nrecioitated its
collanse. The SICDL (Suomien Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto -
Finnish ^^eciles' Democratic Lea-^ue) had been the vehicle
through v/hich the com.m.unists had v/crl'.ed in S'^ite of intern,al
splits focusin-^ -orimarilv on the nart'-'s domestic affairs
Dlatform. 3oth left and ri^ht concur in exnandin^ the state
sector of industr''", hov/ever, a. "^a-^ "between the dc^m^tic and
r'ra'^,matic behavior" exists on the issues of nationa.lization
of ba.n!:s and dismantling^ trade ties v;ith the b'est, thus m.ovin^
25
closer to the Soviet bloc. The crux of the matter lies in
the econom.ic situation in Finland, v;hich if it imnroves "the
2'^
relative calm in Finnish domestic oolitics ma.y be nrolon'^ed."
On interna.tional viev/s, a necessary priority over internal
affairs, they have little diver'^ience from President Kekkonen's
line of neace, security and nro^ress. The communists are on-
Tosed, ho'.'.'ever, to any narticiration or dealinq:s v.-ith IIATO,
EEC or other ties v;ith the b'est v/hich thev blame for Finland's
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domestic econorTiic problems. ^erha'^s the most valuable func-
tion served by the communists in Finland is to serve as a
"v/atchdon; a':^p.inst 'ri"ht--7inT ' factions and as a voca.1 critic
of other Nordic States' forei-^n and securitv ^olicv.""'
There are ten political parties occuDyinq the tv/o hun-
dred seats in "Parliament ••/ith the largest sin-^le narty con-
sistnently bein^ the Social Democrats v.-hose nlatform on social
and economic issues is not unlike that of the other Scandi-
navian Social Democratic Parties, A close second an^^ occ?.-
sional forerunner is the ^eonles' Dem.ocratic League which in-
cludes the comm.unist ^^art'-^ coalition v;ithin its ranks as men-
tioned nreviousl^'- . ^resident Kekkonen is affiliated •••i th the
Center ^arty, formicrly dubbed the A'^^rarian Party. As the old
name imnlies, the^'- count amon^^ their mem.bershin the farmin^^
sector and Finland's extensive rura.l comm;unitv. The last of
the four ma-ior :^arties, the Conservative ^ar"cy, represents the
interests of business and in-^ustry.
Other lesser oarties include the S-.-re'^ish Peebles' Party
whose mem.bershiD is com.r^osed '^rim.a.rily of the S'.'/'edish sr-e^^^lzln^
Finnish nonulation (5.5'^'), a minorit'^ '^rrou'^ of decreasing, num,-
bers. Of annroximately eoual size are the Liberal Part:' and
the Christian Lea'iiue of Finland. The last .-rrouD of a.ny size
is the Rural ^arty - a liberal faction of the Center Partv




As sho'-rn by the '•^reakdo'''n of seats hel^ b'- each narty
in ':;arliansnt in A-^'-cen^li:-: D, there is d. limited vari?.tion
in r'-ctin,!^ patterns o^'-er the last three decades. This is
trihuta.ble in nart to the constant leadershin of Kel'konen and
to a -^reat extent to the traditional votin^ patterns of the
>
.
A political socioloi'ist , Eril: A.llardt, a.nnears to sup-
port this su-^'^osition in one of the fe'- serious stT'ies
of contemporary Finnish comm.unism. From ecological
research he concludes that comimiunist su-joort is to a
larqe extent explained '-.y traditions . 23
Party nembershin has come to folic economic interests
rather closely v;hile nartv mem:bers still m.aintain traditiona.1
affiliations. The result is that the fluctuations in the eco-
nomy are reflected at the -^olls. Accordin'~ly , the base of
su'^'^'Ort of each nart^'" eb'^s and rises ''-'ith the measure of suc-
cess '^ained by the incum.bant decision m:a!:eJ^s . Conse^uentl-^
,
the stabilit;"- of the '^overnmient is tied to their successful
iminlementation of economic -^olic^''. The average of c;lm,ost one
.f^overnm.ent r^er year attests to the hazardous nature of this
business. This should serve to nrovide some insi'^ht into the







Kavip.T looked at the domestic rel5.tior!3 of the Einnish.
political ^^arties in general and the cornmunist '-?rt in -^ar-
ticular, it is no'-r anoronriate to turn to the dominant forei.';fn
nolicy issue of Finnish nolitics: a Nordic Nuclear Free Zone
(or Nuclear Neanon Free Zone, NFZ), Nhile the question of
whether or not t'n.is is a.ctuall"^" the forem.ost foreig.n nolicy
issue m.a.y be raised and other tonics staunchl;' defended, there
can he no ar-^ument th ?t the 'IFZ issue has arisen in t'- e 1~.^'^.-19
timeframe as an inte'~ral '^art of the Finnish defense nlan and
qathers attention frori not only the Nor'^ic sector ^^^' the in-
ternational comr:unit;"- as well.
It is this author's imoression that the NFZ issue has
arisen to the fore and the fact that NFZ is the theme of the
1978 yearhooh of Finnish Foreign ^olicv substantiates this
view, at least fromi the Finnish nersnective. As '•/ill be nointed
out in tJ-'.is clra'-'ter, the attention naid to the Norf-'ic issue
warrants far more than tohen attention from both the Scandi-
na'^/'ian countries and the sunernov:ers alilce. Hence, it s>n',il'-
be u.nd.er3tood v/ithin the context of international strategic
arms limitation and tl"^.e local and re^'ional viev/s as '//ell.
On 28 riay 1963 Finland's President Urho Keldconen ma-^e
a pro'^osal for the esta'^lis'^ment of a NFZ in the Nordic area.
^7hat was oriyinall'-'' labeled a totall-^ unrealistic a^^roach,
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r^.otivate<: oy -ret another alle^rsd disDla-^ of submission to the
Soviet Union has r>ersiste ! in emep'-'in^ as an increasin^lv
,
. 1
-Dlausihle concern: m arms control."
The nuroose of this cha'T'ter is to e::am.ine the r.otives
for this oro"?.osal and to assess the role it can he expected
to nla.y in the overall scheme of -./ea-cons control. The an^roach
v/ill be to reviev/ the brief evolution of IIFZ's, to summarize
the criticisms of the -^ronosal and finall^', to concentrate
on the most recent develo-^r.ents reflected in Presi-'ent '(ehhonen's
sr^eeches in Stocl:holm and Kam.bur-T;.
The essence of President Kekkonen's ^--ronosal ^ut forth
in 19"3 and often repeated is contained in the follc.-in'^:
I am convinced that declaring the Uordic countries a
nuclear-'/eanon-free zone v/ould '^reatl-'- stabilize the
oosition of all the countries in the area. It v;ould
indisrutablv rer,ove the Nordic countries from the
snhere of speculation to v/hich the develo-^vment of
nuclear stratey has '^iven rise and ensure that this
re'-ion rem-ains outside international tensions. 2
The issue of I^FZ's cannot be tal'.en out of context. It
cominrises only a smiall oa.rt of the ^dnole strate'^^ic arm.s debate.
It is bevond the scc^e of this na")er to reviev/ the entire is-
sue, however, and no attempt v/ill be made to expand the issue
of riFZ's beyond v;hat is necessary to nut it nronerly into
context.
If one had to reduce the TIFZ issue to its bare essentials,
there v/ould he three neriods durin^ v;hich significant modifi-
cations of the ori-^inal nronosal have occurred. Bet-;een 1959
and 19 5 5 the TIFZ conce:^t v/as conceived and fostered durino- a
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oeriocl or international 'political iiisen-ra^enent . From 1972
to 1975 the nror-iinence of detente allo'^e'^ for stress of the
links bet'./een the ITor-lic re^^ion and the European continent
based on staoilitv. The current neriod of instabilit:'- since
1973 v/as created by nev; v/eanons technolo^^y a.nd the attendant
3threats from the sunernovrers .
'
The dominant initial reaction one receives to the mention
of ^resident Kekkonen's 1963 '^ronosal for a nuclear free zone
in Scandinavia is skenticism. IIov;ever, '.-/hat be-^^an as a some-
v'hat idealistic viev/ of Ilordic relations a.nd the Scandinavian
role in v.'-orld a.ffairs has evolved into a '?lan of increasing;
si'Tinificance , b'hile .certainlr^ not the orimary focus of arms
treaties in this a'-^e of SALT, GSCE and MFR , the current nro-
nosals of the Finns merit close examination.
The context from '.'hich the subject of a rJordic MFZ has
arisen must be viev;ed v;ith a full anrjreciation for the stra-
tegic si'^nificance of the northern FuroT?ean ^eo^ranhic area.
The Kola Peninsula harbors one of the Soviet Union's most
heavily militarized zones, "an area, of ranidl-'- increasiny stra-
4
teyic imnortance for IIoscova and the b'est." The -greatest
single system of concern to the Soviets is their SLBM fleet,
over seventy nercent of v.^hich is concentrated in their only
5ice-free unrestricted access to the onen seas. Certainly
any oerceived threat to this armada v/ould im.m.ediatelv involve
the r'ordic rc^^ion, a,s any potential mea.ns of interdiction by
NATO v/ould be dealt '-/ith unhesitatin'-^ly by the ICremilin. Hence,
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in the event of a conflict betv-een the v/arsav/ I^act and ?IATO,
Northern Uorv/ay v'ou.l^ have considera'^le in-^ortance. For the
''est at the very least, this area ^./ould be (and is) an in"->or-
tant for'.^ard observation -ooint. From the Soviet nersnective,
based on ''orld ',^ar II ex'^erience, it can be vie'/ed as a. poten-
tial brid'-'ehead for an offensive. And as mentioned above, the
Soviets mi'^ht feel obli-^ated to take nossession of this area
in order to secure the access route to the Atlantic.'
Accectin'^ the importance of this area for '-/hat it is, let
us turn to an exam.ination of the chronoloy/ of events '.:hich
brought about Kekkonen ' s 1963 intrO''"'uctor'' '^ro-^osal and the
subsequent evolution of the policy as it became increasingly
significant
.
The origins of the concent of nuclear free zones (IIFZ)
lie not '-/ith the Finns, as is often surmisei, but rather './ith
the Poles, East Germans, Soviets and Sv/edes. The focus of
attention 'ras centered on the Baltic Sea. The C-arm.an Dem.ocratic
Fvenublic and the Soviet Union made a ,ioint call in June 1959
"to l^ecD the Baltic Sea free of nuclear missies and stationino;
of forei~n troons."7 It v/as as a result of NATO maneuvers in
this area in 1961, narticularlr^ b'est Germ.an oartici-^aticn
,
that the Kremlin voiced stron'^ objections and sou^^ht to in-
voke the military coo-^eration clasues of the 1948 Treat-^ of
Friendshin, Cooneration and !Iutual Assistance '•ith Finlan-'.
A sim.ilar -oronosal for Central Furo-^e v.^as raised in '°oland
by Adam. Ra.-ack.i, Sub3e'-:uentl\^ , in the fall of 1961, Sv/edish
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For'3i~n 'linister Oster Undin "nut for^./ar"! his i-rlea of a
'non-nuclear club,' nembsrs of v/hich v.'oul'I nled'^e thenselves
not to acquire nuclear './ea'^ons theriselves or to receive such
o
v/eanons on their territcrv on beb.alf of other "ov.-ers . ""'
President heb'-onen's nronosal of 2.S May 19n3 v;as actually
the reener'^izin": of the Sv^edish rro'^'Osal vith sor,-'.? notifica-
tions, '-^rinaril" the dronnin'^ of a linkage to an a^^reement
on a nuclear test ban. In this, his first sneech on the sub-
ject, Kek!:onen nointed out that in fact the Scandinavian states
alreavd;,^ constituted a NFZ. b'hat Finland sou;^ht to do v;as to
consoli'-b^.te the Scandinavian position ^-hich is made un of s.s
ns.n>' different ao'^'roaches to securit-/ as there are countries.
These annroaches v/ill be e::?j~iined in deta.il concernin- their
inn act on ''IFZ's.
In revie'-zin':' this relatively,' brief histor*-' of nuclear
free zones one cannot ignore the motives inherent in mabin?
such nro-^osals. ^lanv noint to b.eld'-onen ' s 1963 nlan as vet
another exannle of influence beiny exerted on the Finns by
the Kremlin, In 'larch 1975 Time •;ent so far as to label Kek-
Q
b.onen the ICremlin's "errand bov" in Scandinavia." ''hile this
comnarison may fit the Tuise of Finla.ndization , conder.nation
of Kekbonen's actions is not justified. The Finnish defense
nlan and the Scandinavian nosition in general do not su-^rort
such a contention.
President Kehkonen '^ronosed a Nordic MFZ '-/ith the con-




'.•within the zone in sone significant '/a"." In s.n attemnt
to ^Is;'' a.n effective role in "'.aint^.inin'^ "-'orli neace, Kelc-
konen defined the small states' role as one in ^'hich thev
disassociate themselves from evervthin'^ that is li'-^el'^ to
11increase tension." Accusin;^ the Finns of backing such a
nrooosal, solely out of obedience to the direction of Mosco-/',
'.7ould be al-:in to attributing American intentions in SALT II




Puttiny the expressed objective of the Finns in the con-
text of their lon-^ term interests, it is clear that ICekk.onen's
nlan is not a radical departure from their defense nlan, but
rather is in consonance ".'ith both Finnish a.nd Scandinavian
ob.iectives as a v/hole.
''ith these earl^^^ develo'om.ents in the evolution of the
current Finnish concent of IIFZ's, let us turn to an exainina-
tion of snecific objectives of the nolicy. There are several
ar~um.ents in favor of the nronosal. First and forem.ost amiony
these is the comimonl;-'' accented notion that nroliferation of
nuclear '.-/eanons is a threat to securitv and v;orld order. The
comnarison of the riFZ to the rion-?roliferation Treaty serves
to underscore this fact. b'hst •.'•ould be encom-«assed in the
Finns' NFZ nronosal are five forms of nrol iferation nervention:
a)nanuf acturin'^ , testin^^ and develonment of nuclear ••eanons;
b)transfer of nossession or control of nuclear v:eanons;
c ) stationinfT a nuclear nov;er's ov;n ''.'eanons in the zone area;
d)nuclear v/eanon transit throuyh the zone; and
e)nuclear shariny
. . .
one state receives nuclear v7ea'-^ons
'on behalf of another state. -'-'^
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'hat arises here are the stark realities of the diverse
routes that have been tal'en h;'' the Nordic countries in -pur-
suit of security'. The "military base ^olic;'^" of the UATO
members, Denm.ark and rjor'.'/ay, meets the criteria of rIFZ's in
peacetime . This absence of nuclear v/ea^-^ons in this area in
'^ecacetir.o is not m.atched '^•y f^uarantees of ^irotection from, bein':^
the tar'~;et of nuclear '-reanons. Nor does the nlan of the tv/o
NATO countries nreclude introduction of offensive nuclear
\\^eanons in crisis situations.
The realities of ^eo-^ranh^' lar^^el;" '^.ictate the nee'"^ for
this nuclear c-^tion for the Nordic NATO m.em.bers. Contrasted
v/ith the sufficiently isolate-' nuclear free zone of Antarctica
or Latin America, one qains an an'^reciation for the com.nle-ities
injected into the equation v/hen dealing v/ith the increasin^^
strategic significance of the northern flan!: in the jlast-'.'est
confrontation. Even in Latin Am.erica, difficulties ha'^e arisen
orimaril" out of the ":ronosed inclusion of lar'~e ocean area.
'/ithin the nuclear free zone, v;hich the Soviets do not ",;ant
13
off-limits to their nuclear m.issle subm.a.rines
.
This area v^a.s addressed in the 1967 Treaty' of Tlatelolco
v;hich formied a nuclear free Latin America, establishin'^ a
'precedent of sorts.
The issue of nuclear free zones ha.s "been ra.ised in the
United Nations in conjunction v;ith several initiatives as
".'ell. Finland canitalized on hostin'^ the CSCE talks to drav;
attention to the issue. Som.e observers contend that the
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source of this attention is derived as much from Mosco':'s
decision to "ive su^nort as fron Helsinki's efforts.
The chairman of the Sunreme Soviet, N. V. '^od'--:orn;.' , in
a ma.-!or S'->eech in Helsinki on 15 October 1974, said that
rioscov/ ';;as nrena.red, in conjunction v;ith the other nuclear
novers, to 'guarantee the status of a nuclear free zone
in the north of Surooe. This v;as reinforced b'.- a tele-
gram to President Kelficonen from "Brezhnev, Pod'^orny and.
Kosy^in nraisin-^ Finland for the imnortance and tim^eli-
ness of its Pohjola NFZ nro^osal.-'*
The concent of ,o;uarantees that the status of nuclear-'./eanon-
free zones '.rould be resnected became the focus of attention
in 1975 vrhen the issue of .guarantees '.^^as lim.ited to the
structures of detente. The incumbant Secretary of Forei"n
Affairs, kei.io Korhonen, nrim.ary sponsor of the action, sum-
marizes his rationale as follo'.'s:
Nuclear v;ea^ons are a threat to the stron" as -'ell as to
the v-eak, to the allied as ';ell a.s to the neutral, to the
dc-'^elor^in-^ and the developed alike. This is inherentl^'
recc^nized in the treat" (betv/een the United States and
the Soviet Union) ''here the narties underta.k.e an ooliya-
tion to conduct, not onl-' their mutual relations, '-ut
also their relations vrith all other states, in a manner
desi-^ned to e:-:clude the 'possibility of an outbreak of
nuclear v/ar an^r/here in the v/orld. The narties also coTi-
mit themselves, once a-^ain an:' as is their c'.v.ty un^''er the
Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from an^ threat
or an;'"'- use of force a'^ainst any countrv.l5
^•.^hat has surfaced is the essential inerredient to fulfill-
ment of the current ^reconditions of a Nordic NFZ: suaer"~ov/er
guarantees. If, as Professor Acunen su-;^ests, a common Nordic
aonroach to the nroblem h.as be-n founU^ in a broad consensus
v;hich linl:s the Nordic NFZ to the Euronean continent, the




re-Tion. The v;irie rarTre of interDretations of v/ha.t forn
these guarantees r.ust take tp.sI'bs it clear that this is a
fomidahle stunhlino; hloc':.
Frop. the Sv/e^-^lish Under-Secretary of State for Forei-n
Affairs, Anders Thunbor^:, the specific demands of Stockholm
v/ere voiced in 1975 as follo'.'s:
If the nuclear-v;ecar,on states sumort an a^-reement on such
a zone - an imnorta.nt condition if it is to be of anv
value - the medium-ran^te ballistic missies and the tac-
tical nuclear v/ea'ions (all exce-^t IC3d and SL3:i) that
are stationed near the zone and that could be directed
af^a-inst targets v/ithin the zone, •..'ill be superfluous,
p.nd the a-^reement should therefore nrovide for their
'/ithdravnl . This annlies to land areas east and south
of the zone and sea areas to the v/est and north. 1'^
This essentially broadens the belt of securit:/ bevond
the strict definition of the riordic region into the Soviet
Kola Peninsula, a stand v/hich ^,oes be^'-ond any interpretation
of current statements by Moscov;. This "somev/hat chidin^' ob-
servation by S;/e^en that the Soviet Ilorthv/est .'ould logically
be included are in sharn contrast to Finland's :ioal of reducin--;
1 ^points of oossible orovocation .
"
For NATO mem.bers, it is obvious that a fundamental shift
in the attitude of the defense nosture of Ilor'-.'ay and Denmiark
v/ould be rer'uired. nuite sim.nly, the current situation does
not lend itself to any ontimism or even an:' positive motivation
for such a drajnatic change in aanroach to the national securitv
by Norv.'a:'- and Denm.ark. The trend is actuallv in the o-^^osite
direction, as increased nartici-^ation in iIATO e::ercises is
seen from, its Scandinavian m.embers.
SI

The thip'i oerioi in this history of IIFZ's carrimenced "ith
the 8 May 1978 Stoclcholm sneech hy Presiient Kek':onen. The
a.ddress itself v;ill he 'liscussed v;ith res'^ect to the 9 Hay 1979
IlamhuT'^ speech, the most recent official expression on the
Nordic NFZ. For r;urnoses of discussion of this third nha.se,
suffice it to say that in .^^eneral terms, this ne''/ increased
interest in sa.id to stem from frro\;in^ concern arisin;^ out of
the instability caused by v/ea'-^ons technolo-^;'^ , such as the cruise
missile. "It is no'-r necessar^/ to ask v/hether the threat of
instabilit'^ is sufficient incentive for the riATO countries
to ne'^^otiate and nossibly abandon the military arms nrocure-
1°
ment advantay.es afiorded by the nev/ v/eanons technolo-y."
''hat overshadov.'s this issue, of course, is the stratc-ic
balance of ^^o^^er in the '.:hole Baltic area. The intensive
buildun of forces b^' the Soviets in the I'.ola. area makes even
the yoal of m^aintainin'-^ the status nuo unrealistic.
Just nrior to Kekkonen's recent visit to the Federp.l
Renublic of Germanv, an arm.s control S"m.nosium, '•as conducted
in Helsinki out of •.dnich some of the vie'/'s later voiced in
the Kamibur.'T sneech became evident. T'./o members of the Fin-
nish delegation narticinatin^ in the ?u,r,'':ash Symnosium. started
v/ith the assumntion that: "the increasing strate;-;ic interest
of the United States and the Soviet Union in the northern
seas area m.akes the Finnish orc^^osal for a I-ior''''.ic NFZ m.ore
on
relevant today than ever before."' ' ''.'hat then becom.^s o'^vious
is that the focus of attention falls on Uorvay and '/hether
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the nuclear ontion her NATO membership '^ives her is " conditio
21
sine '^ua non lor Ilori'-e^ian security."
Although the r^or^ve'^iians m^ay not face a serious nuclear
threat them.selves, "the main Tlor^-e'^ian scenario seems to cie-
nict a potential de^lov'm.ent of conventional forces from, the
Kola Peninsula arainst ITorthern Horv/'ay in a surernov/er con-
flict."'"'" The imnetus for such an act of a-^-^ression by the
Soviets v'ould be either to secure the securit--^ of oassa^^e of
their SL'oII fleet into the Atlantic or to secure death of
securit'7 vis-a-vis the Kola 3^eninsula.~ A'-^ainst this sort
of military threat, the nuclear cation for Morv/a.y serves to
raise the threshold a.ga.inst a local conventional a.tta.ck, but
"at the same tim.e serves as a reassurance for the Ilor^'e'^ians
of their aolitical linka'7;e to the v/ider r^uronean balance of
ao':er.""
Unfortunatel;^ , the constraints on the use of force are
not vie-.'/ed v/ith the same resaect by all aarties concerned.
Desoite Soviet assurances of su^aort, the continue^' inten-
sive buildua in the Kola Peninsula contradicts e\^er:'" reason-
able exaectation for achievin'^ concessions from the Kremlin,
b'hile overt disalays of enthusiastic su'^port for the Finnish
aroaosal are f orthcom.in'^ , the aersistent deliberate efforts
to enhance not only the Kola area but Soviet forces in -eneral
cause these aromises to ring, hollov/.
In his saeech at the Ubersee-Club in Ham.bur^ on 9 Ma""/
1979, President Kekkonen em.^hasized strongly the fact that
83

Finland is ver^^ nuch a Eurc^ean nation, sonethin-i; this author
v.'ould intemret as ^jn^'erscorin^ the increasin^l-'- ^-.'estern ori-
entation of the Finns. After in^^ic a.tini the innorta.nce of
learning the lessons of histor-^, I'e!:!:onen concede'"! the need
for international interdenendence in security. '^ith a nassin^
nention of the militar-' clauses of the Treat;,^ of Friendshin,
Coo-eration and Mutual Assistance and its attendant ooli-:ations
,
the significance of this staterr.ent is discounted v/ith the nro-
nouncement that the 1948 treat'- "does not constitute a niili-
25
tar''- aact." The neutral -^osition that the Finns maintain
is aredica.ted on this fact. In an attennt to innart a sense
of ur'-^enc-' on the natter of establishin-r riFZ's and disa.rnar-.ent
ne'-rotiations in particular, Keld.conen hrou'-^ht into the ''iscussion
tha.t "nev: dan.'^er and uncertaint'/- factors outside Furc-.e ha^-e
a.n-^ea.re-''. on the hori^ion," ^ The -potential inr^act this r.i'~ht
have in Eurcie and the consequences for th.e Finns is vie'-'ed
"/ith annrehension
.
A country in Finland's nosition cannot fail to fep.:--^ an
indirect •'eteriora f^ion of its securit',' situation if the
a.rms race in Eurone accelerates and disarmament negotia-
tions enter an imna.sse. Threatenini si^ns of a. develon-
m.ent in this direction are aercentible .-"7
All of this rhetoric can easily be dismissed if not
viewed in the context of the corinrehensive annroa.ch bein'T pur-
sued ^y Finland in her auest for security. Contrasted v.-ith
the './or^'inc; of the Stockholm speech, iust one year earlier,
one 'Tains an an'^reci^tion for the distinct iifferences in .'.ek-
konen's tone.

No com'-rehensive analysis of these tv;o s-oeeches has
anr^earer] to ip.te. Ho'^ever, the in?ltial reactions fron various
sectors of the Finnish bureaucrac'/ are tellin,^. ' The oninions
ranr,ed from that of Professor Aaunen v.-ho felt that the Hairi-
bup'?; saeech made the necessary shifts in nolic:.' to encourar^e
further dialogue, to the Chief of Political Affairs in the
Ilinistrv of Foreign Affairs, Klaus TOrnudd, v;ho labeled any
29differences v;ith the Stockholm speech as "sunerfluous .
"
Oninions fromi the riilitary sector a.nd the media noted
"sli-^ht" shifts in nolic\'. The head of the Press Section of
the Ilinistr;'^ of Forei~n Affairs, Jaakho Ber-^avist, offered a.
cautious but definite confirm.ation of the differences --.ointed
out by Professor Aaunen and labeled the Hambury sreech as a
30
"nev; ^^oint of reference," ' Piscountinq both the allegedly
radical viev/s of Aaunen and the stoically reserved exaression
of TOrnudd, the temaered oainion of Berynvist surfaces as
strikin-rly moderate, but at the same time thorou-^hlv alausible.
T-.'O conclusions are v-orth notiny and are ^^ertinent both
v/ithin the context of the issue of NFZ's discussed in this
thesis and the broader attendant issue of Finland's position
in the v;orld order.
First and forem.ost to the subject at han'', the resuraence
of interest in arms control brou^-ht on by the success achieved
in SALT II is reflected in the oatimism voiced by Keklconen at
Hambura. In addition, it ha.s brouyht a.bout an anaarent copi-
arom.ise in the Finnish aosition arovidinq increased efforts
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at elicitin'T the commit~ents and ^uar?ntees froin the Soviets
and the United States •.vhich are -ire requisites to formal es-
tablishment of a IIFZ in the Ilordic area. Realistically, the
viev; exoressed by Dr. Ruhala of the Finnish Institute of ;'ili-
tary Science, •.;hich cites a continuing dialor^ue with mainten-
ance of the statue nuo as the current loals, seems to be the
?1
most solid a-r^raisal.
Secondly, the Finns have once a^ain dis'Dlayed that their
eiiternal freedom, of action has increased. Contradict in'7 those
v;ho continue to m.isuse the Finns' name in defining th.e I'rernlin'
objective as Finlandisation or dom.ination of the '/'est European
neonle, I'eVd.conen ' s verv action in this m^ost recent -vesture
tov;ards nrom.otin'^ detente snd a ITFZ serves to emoha.size the
autonom-'- en.-C'-ed by the Finns.
Those '-.'ho initi^.H;^ nointed to the Finnish ambitions as
Soviet ins'~'ired should have '^ained b'^ no'// an a-rrreci-^tion of
the true source of the initiative and its o'-yjectives . Cer-
tainl-^ it must be conceded that som.e of the results of a NFZ
may coincide v'ith "/hat -.rould a'^near to fulfill the ambitions
of the Soviets. The balance of nc'-er v-'ould not '-e disru-^ted,
hov:ever, and the comnrehensive result of est5.blishin^ a ''IFZ
'.•;ould lend sta'^^ility to a ^otentiall" --'olatile area.
Credibility from the Soviet *oersnective is not entirely
lacking. In an article on "The T'orthern Theatre," John Erich-
son s-^ecificall^^ mentions the 1975 revival of the sub.-'ect of
UFZ's ^•"•' the Soviets, commentin.'^ further that he does not

o ake these manifestations to -^e nere i:!le oolitical ^osturin-
r>2
or simnle nro-ja^andistic rriani^ulation . "''"
'/hat this 'r-assin'^ corrmentrar;' seern.s to reflect nore than
anvthinq; else is the un-villin-^ness of Erichson p.nd others to
vie-/' the situation fron the Scandinavian ners'-ective . It is
onl-'- in this conte::t tha.t one can crediblv ar^'T.ie for the es-
tablishment of a nuclear free zone in this area and i'^nore
the attendant nrohlems '.'hich arise out of the intricacies and
overlaonin,'i; a.lliances of the '^reat-nover conflict. The raajority
of the '-'Oints nade in a 1073 article entitled "Prohlerns of
ryrZ's"'""^ remain va.lid toda" in saite of the conciliatory a*"*-
nroach hein-r tahen b;"' ''eh^_:onen.
The onl''' realistic -"oal that the Finns c^n sntici'~'ate is
the continuin'^ dialc^ue './ithin the f r.5J'r!ev,''orl: of on-~oin'7 arms
limitation talhs. The divergent aa^roacbies th.e ^for'.'ic coun-
tries have ta!:en tov/ards national securit--- rem.ain far too in-
con'3ruou3 to exaect a regional ?J.liance '^^eyond -.'hat aresentl-''
e::ists. The current trend of the TfATO members is actually
contrary to the establishment of the 'lordic riFZ based on ^gua-
rantees m.entione'i above. These c;uarantcos m.ay not be forth-
comin'^ from, the sunernov;ers and, as ha.s been -pointed out nre-
viousl;', '.'ould have a m;ar'T;inal im.^act or b?.sis for credibility.
In the final anal-.'sis, there is nrecious little to su--
aort the aros'^iccts for creation of a Nordic I'IFZ as ''.ehb'onen
envisions it. The realities of the situation rem.ain, hov'ever,
and the status cuo has been reasonablv -.-.'•ell maintaine-'' for
G7

these -^a.st sir'.tsen "/ears. Cert.:^-inly the 'position of the
Finns has been enha.nce'''' '-/ith res'^ect to incre.ase:! a-utonomy.
'.^hether Kekhonen's ^ersistent nursuit of this securit;.' -^olic:/'
is the orinary or even a major factor is impossible to ascer-
tain '-rithoiit 5L better un.^'erstandinq of the Soviet ->erce'^tions
".'/hich is not forthcoming.
bTiile '^.ramatic shifts in t--.e structure of the Scandina-
vian defense s-'stem are not envisioned, neither is the erosion
of 'lor-'ic indenendence in ar/^ nuarter. If this is v/hat bein?;
an "errand boy" for I'-Oscov; entrails, it \'Ould seemi reasonable
to assume that r.ekkonen '•"ill absor'" an"" ne-ative nublicit--
in favor of continued -:ains in Finnish autonomr.'. hence, one
'./ill see continued efforts to'.'ar'' achievin-^ a dordic ''FZ '.-ith




P.oqer "^erthoud '.•arned about irav;in^ "nonderous conclu-
1
sions" about the Finnisb conmunists. Ag Cha--^ter V attenpted
to exolain and clarif""', the historical back'^round of Finnish
communism is er.tremelv com.T:lex. " ComnoundinT the 'problem of
sortin- out the coalition politics of this unique form of
narticination bv a communist party in a v/estern style demo-
cracy is the inseparable issue of the relationship of the
Finnish Communist Party and the Soviet Union. The dominatinr^
role this relationship plays must be kept in mind constantly
to appreciate the delicate position of all Finns, not just
those v/ithin the Finnish Communist Party. Certainly the know-
ledge that they have riosco\\r*s blessing can be use'd to some
advantage by the communists in coalition bar'^aining.
The approach taken bv the Finnish comm.unists has many
unique qualities v/hich make it difficult to compare it to other
European communist movements in either Eastern or V/estern
Europe. The sini^le assured conclusion that one can miake is
that the Finnish communists have learned hov/ to survive in
politics v/ithin a democracv. As has been pointed out, unlike
the relatively uncompromisino; nature of many other Eurocom.-
munists, the Finnish communists a':preciate the need to v/ork
v/ithin the system in order to promote their cause. Close ties
to the Kremlin and the influence of geographical proximitv
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cannot be discounted, but evidence of Soviet involvement in
the day-to-day nolitics of Finland is minimal.
Much has been learned from the Finnish experience in
dealing v/ith the great nov/er, the USSR, and it is risky to
take specific examoles of the Finnish communists' behavior
out of context. Even the Soviets have learned the necessity
of having internal sunnort in a country orior to attemnting
to establish a new government. The rejection of Kuusinen's
governmient in 1940, discussed in Chanter V, had many causes,
but the end result cannot by disputed: the Soviets failed to
accomplish v;hat they set out to do. Taken from another per-
spective, the Finns successfully resisted an attem.nt on the
nart of a conquering pov/er to install a Dunnet government.
No one can predict the future of Finnish nolitics, al-
thouqh the historical precedent does seem to hold narticularly
true for Finland. This is esnecially evident if one accents
the proposition put forth earlier concerninfr the strong tra-
^'-itional voting patterns of the Finns. Furthermore, v/ith a
nrecedent of centuries versus decades, one must take account
of the firmly rooted democratic ideals of thise neonle both
as Finns and as Scandinavians.
The results of the March 1979 elections are the most
recent reflection of the extent to vx^hich the Finns have moved
towards a role of independence from Soviet influence. The
worst showing by the Communists since being recognized in
1945 is not solely an adverse reaction to Soviet media
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influence, but rather the lop;ical extension of v/hat has been
a deliberate a-n'' persistent move tov/ards increased autonomy.
Clearly, the economic factors cannot be discounted as unem-
ployment nud(^es eif^ht nercent, but Conservative f^ains v/ere
disproDortionately high (23^j). To attribute these gains
solely to any one cause vAould be oversimplifying the matter.
Suffice it to say that oerceptions of Soviet tolerance, com-
bined v/ith v/hat Christian Science Monitor corresnondent , Ron
Sharer, described as a backlash against Soviet nress v/arnings
not to vote for the Conservative Party, both contributed to
3
a setback for the left.
V/hether this trend v/ill continue to exoand the limits
of Soviet acquiescence and increase the latitude of Finnish
movement is difficult to confirm. The sharo contrast of the
relatively calm after-effects of this election v/ith the in-
dignant and crisis-enhancing response to the 19R1 election
provides a firm indication of Finnish progress tov/ard autonomy.
Can these conclusions be projected to the situations of
other Eastern European countries? In general, these coun-
tries have already learned the lessons of submissive allegiance
to the CPSU the hard way. Can they still be influenced by
Finland's example?
Certainly there are many individual characteristics of
each of the Warsav; Pact countries that could be nointed out
as clearly distinguishing aspects of their bilateral interaction
with the Kremlin, Likewise, the Soviets v/ould be auick to
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refute any stereo-tyne ima^e of a '^.oininate . rinfi of buffer
states on her ^vestern front. The wide ran^e of approaches
to ruling and party participation is in evidence from the
\'i3Y Tito ran Yu7,oslavia to Ulbricht's reit^n in the German
Democratic Renublic.
Similarly, V.^estern European communist r^arties, or Euro-
communists as they are called, disnlay a diversity of olat-
forms and exercise a v;ide variety of tactics in their auest
for increased involvement in the affairs of state; esnecially,
in Italy, France and Snain.
None of these countries has a oopulation, economy or
history that closely matches that of Finland, but there are
some lessons of a 'general nature that the Finns have learned
that seem to this author to be applicable to other Soviet
neighbors
.
First and foremost, the Finns understand the Soviet re-
spect for force. This is the sort of precedent that is dif-
ficult to establish, but to c^ain a reoutation as a fighter
can (70 a lonp; v/ay at the bargainin<7 table. Certainly it is
a consideration in the Kremlin when the costs of intervention
are weif^hed in contemolation of offering fraternal assistance.
The V/inter V/ar experience, as DOinted out in Chanter II, has
considerable reason to remain fresh in the minds of the Soviets
Secondly, the willingness to ooerate within mutually
understood narameters of toleration has gotten the Finns re-
peated and consistent gains in many phases of interaction
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v/ith the Soviets. This predictable nature has contributed
in lar<7e part tov/ard building support for the third lesson:
the effective use of force.
As expounded in Chanters IV and V, President Kekkonen's
unique style of intimate diDlomacy has built an aura rivaled
only by the style that Tito disolayed. The intangible nature
of personal trust as a factor must not be discounted. It has
and v/ill continue to play a major role in Finnish foreign
Dolicy as v;ell as domestic oolitics.
The example of Russo-Finnish relations as a model for
other nations to follow in dealing with a great newer so as
to avoid domination has many limitations as brought out ear-
lier. Nevertheless, the princioles follov/ed by the Finns
in successfully nursuing their current policy of active neu-
trality are annlicable to the industrialized countries. The
role of toleration by the Soviets in holding up Finland as the
examnle of how tv/o countries can coonerate cannot be discounted.
This author feels, however, that the Finns have successfully
nlayed their politics to evolve from a subjugated, defeated
nation in 1944 to an effective memba? of the international com-
munity. To summarize the historical relationship brought out
in detail in Chapter II, from her initial connuored status
after '/orld V/ar II, Finland has orogressed to a stance of
autonomous neutrality. There can be little doubt that Finland's
position has become one that is increasingly independent /ith
respect to the Kremlin.
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By putting the oriority on foreio;n DOlicy, domestic
considerations in Finland have suffered somewhat. But at
least this attention to foreign affairs has met v/ith a larp;e
measure of success in gainin,^ a favorable oosition on the in-
ternational scene. Kekkonen, as nrimary a-^ent of Finnish
foreign policy, has effectively played the Soviets' croals to
his country's advantage. He has the trust of the Kremlin and
appreciates the strength of his oosition as both a oonular
leader of the Finnish oeople and an effective player on the
international scene.
It does not seem that it v/ould be going too far to say
that Kekkonen has taken advantage of the Soviets, holding un
his country as an examole of Russian cooperation v/ith a
democracy, Finnish leaders appreciate the need of the Soviets
to maintain good relations v/ith them, and are caoable of oner-
ating very effectively within the boundaries of Soviet tolera-
tion. The Dosition of Finland imoroves as her economic ties
to the European Economic Community and other non-Communist
nations enhance the strength of thr economy v/ith the exception
of energy.
The positive imoact of the economy is felt in other sec-
tors of Finnish society as v/ell. Stability in internal ooli-
tics is closely tied to the economy as party lines are alligned
largely according to nrofession. The shift back to the center
away from the Communist coalition in the March 1979 Parliamen-
tary elections must serve as the most recent indicator. On
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the basis of these favorable notes for Kekkonen's DOlicies,
the necessary suoport to stabilize the sa^^aiTrg economy should
be forthcoming.
In a 1976 reoort of the Second Parliamentary Defense
Committee, Finland's ov/n percention of the effects of her
security policy v;ere expressed as far-reaching:
The ODDortunit^,'- for small countries to influence inter-
national policies have Q;rovm in the 1970' s. The increase
in the contacts and forms of cooperation betv/een nations
has at the sajne time DOsed a challenge, especially to
the foreign policy of neutral countries. By virtue of
its neutral nosition Finland has Darticipated actively
in international cooperation. ..
4
Finland has been a positive influence an^'' "rill be an
increasing!;/ Dositive force as Kekkonen's nolicy of active
neutrality achieves greater autonomy for the Finns. The Finns
are not the only ones confronted v/ith a dilemma; the Soviets
face an equally formidable quandry in Scandinavia:
The Soviet dilemma inheres in the fact that an exoloita-
tion of the CDnortunity to induce Morv/ay and Denmark
to drift av/ay from NATO by acquiescing in or encouraging
the formation of a Scandinavian bloc, would involve the
unacceptable risk of Sv/eden, and, narticularly , Finland,
drifting in a v/estward direction.
^
The road that Finland is being led dov;n by President
Kekkonen is in as safe and as effective a direction as our
ideals of v/estern democracy could hooe for. We should respect
the delicate balance that the Finns maintain and heln them
most by not interfering. Or, as George Kennan put it, "v/e
can help them only by giving them our resnect for their
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remarkable accomplisl-.rr.ents as a peo-^le, an:! our \Tnc^er:-i'CB:ry^\ln%
for their unique and delicate geographic situation."
In atteraDting to define Finlandization it has become
clear that the term has been maligned to the point of almost
escaoing definition. It has been this author's contention
that the essence of the term Finlandization is embodied in
the question oosed by President John F. Kennedy in the fol-
lov/ing exernt from an article by H. Peter Krosby:
All of the basic Western assumptions regarding Soviet
intentions and Finland's uneviable situation v/ere im-
plicit in President John F. Kennedy's revealing ques-
tion, ... 'v/hat nuzzles us Americans is vrhy the Soviet
Union has allowed Finland to retain her independence?''^
Tiiose v/ho feared detente v/ould nave the v;ay for the ex-
tension of Soviet influence "sav; Finland as an example of a
country already remotely controlled from Moscow and held it
up as a v/arning to the rest of 7estern Eurone." On the con-
trary, the Finns hardly nrovide the best exajanle of a European
country/ that has become Sovietized, if that is what Finlandi-
zation renresents.
V/hat should be increasingly apoar-nt from the evidence
presented is that there is a disparity between the negative
connotations involved in the term Finlandization and the
reality of the Finnish position. If one dwells on the current
level of involvement by the Soviet Union in Finnish affairs,
a case could be made for a somev/hat vague structure of influ-
ence being exerted. ^^hen taken in the context of comparing
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Finland's position today vis-a-vis 1944, Soviet involvement
has obviously diminished to an almost insi-^nificant level.
In his address in Hamburg on 9 riay 1979, President
Kekkonen pointed out some of the unique asnects of Finnish
history v/hich contribute to this dramatic evolution of a
country in such a short neriod of time. In spite of coming
out on the losing side of both the l!inter V/ar and the Continu-
ation War, Helsinki stood as one of only three European capi-
tals not occupied, the other tv/o being Moscov; and London.
Having maintained this status to the nresent day, at the
very least the Finns must be credited with a policy that has
precluded the physical nresence of the Soviets. It could be
argued that Finnish neutrality is self-imoosed and from the
Soviet point of viev/ it is "cheap since it snares the outsider
[_the USSRJ the need to invest time, money and effort in stage-
managing the transformation and keeping the nev; spirit alive
q
and functioning properly."
It is the conclusion of this thesis that the Finns are
very much aware of the Soviets oragmatic aporoach to their
relationship v/ith Finland, and they have exploited it in a
very successful manner.
There is an element of risk inherent in making a research
trin of anv sort, narticularly if the researcher has comnleted
the majority of bis reading on the subject before embarking.
While this v/as the situation in the oursuit of investigating
this thesis, a conscious attempt to maintain objectivity v/as
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made, the success of v/hich is left to the reader to jud'^e.
Honefully any evidence offered from interviev/s did not aonear
Drejudiced as that secured by an author travelling in search
of only supportin'7 material. Those individuals v/ho r^enerously
shared their time and ooinions v/ere considerate enough to pro-
vide a diverse spectrum of viev/points from various sectors of
the Finnish government and media. The prevailing impression
gained v/as one of the great nride harbored by the oeonle of
Finland. Certainly they have their share of problems and are
av/are of them. The overwhelming majority of neoole this author
came in contact with, hov/ever, from the thoroughly professional
tour guides to university professors and govern.nent officials,
v/ere lustly proud of their heritage and current nosition in
world nolitics. The disnronortionately significant role that
is olayed by this small nation testifies to the strength of
will of the DeoT^le. '/Jhether or not this thesis convinces
you of the m.easure of autonomy the Finns have achieved or the
inportance of Finland's role in international -DOlitics, the
sincerity and pride of the Finnish neoole toward this en 1 is
annarent to anv v;ho care to look. Anything less is a con-




TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, CO-OPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE
BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND AND THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS SIGNED ON APRIL 6, ] 948
ARTICLE 1
In the eventuality of Finland, or the Soviet Union through
Finnish territory, becoming the object of an armed attack by Germany
or any state allied with the latter, Finland will, true to its obli-
gations as an independent state, fight to repel the attack. Finland
will in such cases use all its available forces for defending its
territorial integrity by land, sea and air, and will do so within
the frontiers of Finland in accordance with obligations defined in
the present Agreement and, if necessary, with the assistance of, or
jointly with, the Soviet Union.
In the cases aforementioned the Soviet Union will give Finland
the help required, the giving of which will be subject to mutual
agreement between the Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE 2
The High Contracting Parties shall confer with each other if it
is established that the threat of an armed attack as described in
Article 1 is present.
ARTICLE 3
The High Contracting Parties give assurance of their intention
loyally to participate in all measures towards the maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security in conformity with the aims and prin-




The High Contracting Parties confiinn their pledge, given under
Article 3 of the Peace Treaty signed in Paris on 10th February 1947,
not to conclude any alliance or join any coalition directed against
the other High Contracting Party.
ARTICLE 5
The High Contracting Parties give assurance of their decision
to act in a spirit of co-operation and friendship towards the further
development of consolidation of economic and cultural relations between
Finland and the Soviet Union.
ARTICLE 6
The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to observe the
principles of the mutual respect of sovereignty and integrity and that
of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other State.
ARTICLE 7
The execution of the Present Agreement shall take place in ac-
cordance with the principles of the United Nations Organization.
ARTICLE 8
The present Agreement shall be ratified and remains in force
ten years after the date of its coming into force. The Agreement
shall come into force upon the exchange of the instruments of ratifi-




Provided neither of the High Contracting Parties denounces it
one year before the expiration of the said ten-year period the Agree-
ment shall remain in force for subsequent five-year periods until
either High Contracting Party one year before the expiration of such
five-year period in writing notifies its intention of terminating the
validity of the Agreement.
In witness hereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present
i^reement and affixed their seals.
Done in the city of Moscow on the sixth day of April 1948 in
two copies, in the Finnish and the Russian languages, both texts being
authentic.
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NUMBER OF SEATS OUT OF 200
1975 1972 1970 1966 1962 1958 1954 1951
54 55 52 55 38 48 54 53
40 37 36 41 47 50 43 43
39 35 36 50 53 48 53 51
35 34 37 26 32 29 24 28
10 10 12 12 14 14 13 15
9 7 8 8 13 8 13 10
9 4 1 - - - - -
2 18 18 1 - - - -
2 — — 7 3 3 — —
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